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CHAI>TER I
KOREA--DILEMMA AND DISASTER
A divided nation.

At the end of World War II Korea

was occupied by the forces of the United States and the
Soviet Union.

The Thirty-eighth Parallel was arbitrarily set

as the boundary between the forces of occupation.

This

arbitrary boundary was not intended to result in the creation
of two separate governments; rather it was to prevent the
Soviet forces from occupying the whole nation.
been under Japanese rule from 1910 to 1945.

Korea had

At the Cairo

Conference in 1943, Roosevelt, Churchill, and Chiang Kai-shek
declared that in due course Korea should become free and independent.

This was later reaffirmed at Potsdam in 1945.

At

the end of \1/orld War II Russian troops were massed along the
Manchurian border, while the nearest American forces were in
Okinawa.

Thus the military division of Korea was solely in-

tended for the purpose of temporary occupation of the military forces.
Even before the outbreak of the Korean War that nation had become a political headache for the United States.
The cost of occupation was high, and troop morale was low.
Furthermore, South Korea thought the occupation had gone on
long enough, even though it needed American help.

All at-

tempts to unify the nation. by a United Nations supervised

2

election failed due to Soviet opposition.

A South Korean

government was formed in Aui:;us t 1948 with :3yngma.n Hhee as its
first President.
ment was created.

In September 1948 the North Korean governRhea apparently felt that police state

.methods were needed to kec1p the Communists from taking over
in South Korea.

However, in April 1950, the State Department

felt it necessary to itmrn Dr. Rhee that further American
assistance would be withheld unless he balanced his budget,
inaugurated democratic reforms, and held elections.
tions were held on May 30, 1950.
22 of 210 seats. 1

J:Uec-

Rhea's party retained only

l'Jhatever degree of dictatorial methods

Rhee used in the past, dictators do not allow themselves to
be be<1ten in elections, and South Korea had experienced the
workings of the most basic of democratic institutions.
In a move extremely well calculated to create an a\vkward situation for the United States, the Soviet Union announced the complete wi thdrav1al of its occupation forces
from Korea effective December 25, 1948.

Since Soviet troops

were v-.ri t.hdrawn only to the .Hanchurian border all the s tratet._;ic and propaganda benefits accrued to Moscow.
clever move.

It was a

111 thdrawal of American troops to Japan was corn-

pleted June 29, 1949.

While the Soviets had left a well

trained and equipped North Korean Army, the forces of South
1 John Gunther, The Riddle of MacArthur (New York:
Harper and Brothers, 1950), p. 189:-

3
Korea had neither the training not the equipment to match
North Korea's.
Korea -and
:Formosa -are excluded -from -the ...;;;..;;.;.;..;:;.=.;;;.
defense
--perimeter .2f

~United

States.

In a statement made to the

National Press Club on January 12, 1950, Secretary of State
Acheson said that both Korea and Formosa were outside the
defense perimeter of the United States. 2 This did not alter
the fact that both areas were still the responsibility of the
United Nations.

Nevertheless, it is doubtful that such a

statement could have accomplished anything, and it was both
unnecessary and unwise, even if it were true at the time.
Combined with the recent withdrawal of United States forces,
it seemed to suggest an open door for aggression in South
Korea.
The significani military developments in Korea.

The

North Korean Communists, under the leadership of Hoscowtrained Kim Il-sung, were willing to discuss unification of
Korea, but they flatly refused to deal with the government
of Syngman Rhee for that purpose.

In short, it was clear

that what they wanted was Communist unification instead of a
democratic Korea.
On June 25, 1950, the forces of North Korea crossed
2 Time, June 11, 1951, p. 23.

4
the Thirty-eighth Parallel (June 24, in the United States).
Secretary of State Acheson immediately advised Trye;ve Lie,
Secretary-General of the United Nations, of this action.
Hr. Ide called an emergency meeting of the Security Council
for Sunday·, June 25.

The Security Council condemned the

invasion and called for an irmnedia to cease fire and withdrawal of North Korean troops from South Korea.
in the Security Council was nine to zero.

The vote

Yugoslavia ab-

stained from voting, and Russia was not present.

The

Soviet Union had boycotted the Security Council meetings
since January.
President Truman ordered General MacArthur to give
immediate military support to the forces of South Korea.
The President did not, then or in the future, ask Congress
for a declaration of v.tar.

i!owever, the majority of Con-

gress, Republican as well as Democrats, approved the President • s action.

rrechnically Mr. Truman acted as Commander

in Chief of the armed forces in response to a request from
the United Nations Security Council.

This is the expla-

nation of the reference to the Korean War as a "police
action."
General t1acArthur

vms

designated Supreme Commander

of the United Nations forces in Korea.

The United States

and South Korea furnished the bulk of the fighting forces,
but several nations sent

contin~ents

of ground troops and

5
naval or ,;:;,ir

unit~>

to Korea.

'l'he United J

t~·l.t,~s

could not

jeopa.rdi ze its occupation forces in Japan, a.nd it was some

time before effective military pressure could be brought to

bear.

Tne consequence of this situation was that during

July and Au.t;us t, 1950 the (forth KorHan forces pushed the
'3outh Koro:m and United :3tates armies into the southeast
corner of Korea 1 known as tho Pusan beachhead.

During September and October, the United
forces began to counter-attack.

~L:ttions

A brilliant amphibious

landinG was conceived and directed by MacArthur at Inchon on

the west coast of Korea.

The situation involved landing at

a city t.mder incredible tidd.l condi tio:ns.

On

~1cptember

15,

the tide rose to 30 feet in six ·hours; in the next six hours
it fell to six feet. 3

tide.

·rne landing

l1ad

to be made at hiGh

There were also the problems of enemy magnetic mines,

shore batteries, and the possibility of Chinese entry into
the -..var about tha. t time.

The purpose of this at tack vm.s to

hit the enemy in the rear, and cut off his forward units.
ne did

not have strength in depth.

This v1ould disrupt his

supply lines and make pos;::;ible the retaking of Seoul, the

capital of South Korea, which was in enemy hands.

The risks

were Great, but the results proved that it was worth the
3 Charles A. VJilloughby, Major General, MacArthur
(New Yorks McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1954),

1.241,-1221

p. 369.

6

gamble.

The whole operation was a tribute to MacArthur's

military ability.

The Thirty-eighth Parallel was exposed to

the forces of the United Nations• and a turning point in the
war had been reached.
In the United Nations and in the capitals of the world
there was much discussion about what to do next.
reports that the Chinese Communists

~t~ould

There were

enter the fighting

if the United Nations forces crossed the Thirty-eighth Parallel.

The military problem was one thing; the political

problem another.

This is why democracies require that the

military authority be subordinate to the civil authorities.
In tb:Ls case North Korea had invaded South Korea and had been
pushed back into its own territory.

Not wishing to antag-

onize Com..rnunist China, some members of the United Nations
strongly urged that the fighting not be carried into North
Korea.
sition.

Great Britain v1as the principal advocate of this poHowever,

l~a.cArthur

was given permission to cross

into North Korea, and on October 9 1 the United Nations forces
inv1aded

~forth

Korea.

Within three weeks his troops 1t1ere

nearing the Hanchurian border.
On October 3, the State Department reported that the
Chinese Foreign Minister, Chou En-lai, had advised the Indian
Ambassador at Peiping that if United Nations forces crossed
the Thirty-eighth Parallel China would send troops to help
the North Koreans.

However, this action would not be taken

7

if only South Koreans crossed the Thirty-eighth Parallel. 4
There was involved in this the problem of determining whether this warning was so much propaganda, or a true statement
of their intentions.
President Truman decided that he wanted to have a
personal talk with General MacArthur.

The General had been

out of the United States for fourteen years and, according
to the President, "all his thoughts were wrapped up in the
East. 11 5

In addition the President felt that in spite of the

Administration's attempt to keep MacArthur advised on the
world-wide picture as seen in Washington, it had not sueceeded.

"I thought," said the President, "he might adjust
more easily if he heard it from me directly. 116 Finally, the
Peiping threats of intervention in Korea were another reason
for the President's desire to confer with MacArthur.
The meeting took place at Wake Island on October 15,
local time.

In his Memoirs, the President said that Mac-

Arthur had assured him that victory had been won in Korea,
and that the Chinese Communists would not attack. 7
MacArthur's biographers do not agree with the President regarding the reasons for the meeting at Wake Island
or with the results which the President concluded from the

4 Harry s.

Truman, Memoirs, Vol. 2 (Garden City, New
York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1956), P• 363.

--

5 Loc. cit.

--

6 Loc. cit.

7 Ibid., P• 365.

8

In his book, MacArthur ] 241-1951M, Najor General
Charles Willoughby observed: 8

meeting.

vli th an eye to the coming elections, it v1as expedient
for the President to smooth over the differences • • •
with his principal field commander. • • • It was equally expedient to exploit politically the smashing victory
at Inchon and directly link the Administration with this
impressive success.
l~azier

Hunt concluded, "Despite the outwardly

friendly nnture of

thE~

visit there seem to have been very

few, if any tangible results." 9

He also no ted that the tvlO

men most concerned with the developments in the .Far East and
with the rise or fall of General MacArthur--Secretary of
State Acheson and Secretary of Defense Marshall--had remained
in \>Jashington.

\Vi th all due

resp~;ct

to Hunt's wisdom and

experience, it is hard to see how bringing Marshall and
Acheson to \1/ake Island could have helped the relationship
between 1'rurnan and MacArthur.

Furthermore, there was great-

er need :for them in V/ashington while the Chief Executive was
out of the country.
Late in November l'1acArthur ordered a general advance,
hoping to end the war "before Christmas."

His troops were

t.hreatening the N;:;mchurian border and the pov1er houses along
the Yalu River, when the character o:f the vJar changed.
8 Willoughby, Q£•

£11.,

p. 382.

9 l"razier Hunt, The Untold Story of General MacArthur
1954), p. 477.

(Nmv York: The Devin-Adair Company,

-l

"'I
-1

:
'j

JJ

9

j

!
1

Chinese troops crossed the border from Manchuria and
launched a major counteroffensive.

A thrust by the Chinese

split the United Nations forces in two.

Those in the north-

east \vere surrounded and trapped, but were finally evacuated
by sea from the port of Hungnam.

Although the evacuation

was made possible by highly skillful operations of the
United States Navy, it was a :Far

EastE~rn

Dunkirk.

It was

not long before the remaining United Nations forces were
driven back below the Thirty-eighth Parallel, and there was
considerable alarm that the United Nations might be forced
back to the old Pusan beachhead.

There was also concern

that the "limited war" might turn into World War III.
In late January

ttnd

February, 1951 t the United

Nations forces halted the enemy advance and began a series
of cautious advances.

By the end of March, United Nations

forces again reached the Thirty-eighth Parallel, and in some
places advanced beyond it.

CHAP'TER II

THE MacAR'!HUR CONFJ,ICT
The events leading 1Q the dismissal Q! General
/irthur.

~

\·/hila the United Stt:\tes put forth most of the effort

in fighting the Korean War, it was done in the name of the
United Nations.
United

One of the major considerations of the

r~ations \1as

world war.

to keep the local war from becoming a

England had special reasons for keeping the war

limited to Korea, since any threat to China would undoubtedly

result in a counter threat to the British colony, Hong Kong.
Consequently the United L-Hates was not free to malw the decisions and determine the measures that should be used for
winning the war; the decis1ons were not ours alone.
The Truman Administration had written off Chiang Kaishek as a bad risk; it felt that it was throwing good money
after bad to support him.

This was also the British view.

MacArthur, on the other hand, seemed to·balieve that we ought
to give him the respect due a friend.
it than that.

But there was more to

On July 31, 1950, MacArthur suddenly flew to

Formosa and spent a day and a half consulting with the Generalissimo.

Neither TruiD.f'J.n nor the Joint Chiefs of Staff

v;ere informed beforehand of this trip.

However, as the Amer-

ican commander in Japan and the United Nations commander in
Korea, he had both the right and the duty to inspect the For-

mosa area, since he had the specific duty to defend it.

On

June 27, 1950, President ·rruman had ordered the neutralization of Formosa. 1

Ho',,rE)Ver, it was not tactful of MacArthur

to make this kind of trip without first informing Washington.
i•1oreover, the fanfare attending his arrival gave the impres-

sion that he sympathized strongly with nationalist aims and

policy, as he undoubtedly did.

Chiang Kai-shek said, "The

foundation for Sino-American military cooperation has been
This appeared as if the United States vJer<~ about to

laid. n 2

enter into a new Chinese civil war.

President Truman

S<lvl

this as General NacArthur mt:tking, or at least interfering

·vlitht foreign policy.

He sent Averell Harriman to Tokyo,

"to brief General M::tcArthur on what American foroign policy
·
'
n3
was, an d t o as k ~rum
·t o i mprove ,h'1s ti rung.

On August 10th MacArthur issued a statement in which
he said, with aggressive emphasis, that his visit to Formosa
was limited entirely to military matters; and that Chinese

domestic affairs

~vere

altogether out of his own responsi-

bility and province.
r4y visit, the General said, has been maliciously

represented to the public by those who invariably, in
the past have propap;andized a policy of defeatism and
appeasement in the Pacific • • • which tend, if indeed

1 John Gunther, 'I:he Riadle

.2!

MacArthur (New York:

Harper and Brotherst 1950), P• 190.

2

~ ••

pp. 195-96.

--

3 I,oc. cit.

12

they are not designed, to promote disunity and destroy
faith and confidence in the American nation and institutions and Americ~n representatives at this time of
great world peril.
On August 28, 1950, another explosion between President •rruma.n and General MacArthur took place when a messa,:;e
to the Veterans of Foreign Wars convention at Chicago was released, in advance, to the press.

An alert newspaperman got

hold of it and called it to the attention of the White House.
:President Truman ordered the message vii thdrawn from the convention; however, it
tion.

i'1ad

already reached newspaper publica-

It was published in the

~

York Times, on August 29.

In this statement MacArthur said that Formosa was part of the
new battle line that made the Pacific a peaceful American
lake, that the western strategic frontier had shifted from an
"exposed island salient extending out through Hawaii, Midway,
and Guam to the Philippines. n 5
of weakness along which
been attacked.

w~

'rhis, he held, vJas an av(mue

were subject to attack and had

Formosa in the hands of an enemy \>las to be

compared to an unsinkable aircraft carrier and submarine tender, strategically located, vlhich could be maintained at a much

4 Gunther, 12£• £!!., PP• 195-96.
5 u.s. Cong., Armed Services Committee, "Hearings Relative to the Facts and Circumstances Bearing on the Relief of
General of the Army Douglas MacArthur and on the American
.Policy in the Far East," Militar.:~ Situation.!!! !!1! ~ ~·
82nd Gong., 1st Sess., 1951, Part 5, p. 3478.

13
lower cost than its equivalent in aircraft carriers and submarine tenders.

ttNothing," he said, "could be more falla-

cious than the threadbare argument by those who advocate appeasement and defeatism in the Pacific that if we defend
6
Formosa we alienate continental Asia."
President Truman, in a fireside chat, then explained
to the na·tion and the world, nwe do not want Ji'ormosa or any
part of Asia for ourselves.

We believe that the future of

Formosa • • • should be settled peaceably • • • by international action." 7 There could be read into MacArthur's
statement an implied criticism of the neutralizing of Formosa.

It was apparent that MacArthur had a talent for this

sort of thing.

Furthermore, many people believed that be-

cause of his experience and record of achievement, his opinion was needed.

President Truman's military experience was

limited to that of an artillery captain in \Vorld War I.
\'/hen MacArthur was Army Chief of Staff Marshall was a colonel who had never had a field command.

The contrast could

not be overlooked by the press and the public.
On September 12, 1950, Secretary of Defense Johnson
resigned, effective September 19.

General George Narshall,

followinB a special act of Congress to make a military

6 Hearings, Part 5, p. 3478.

7 New York Times, April 15, 1951t "Chapters in Dispute," p.E-1:--

14

officer eligible for that post, became Secretary of Defense.
The Wake Island meeting of Truman and MacArthur
shocked almost everyone with its brevity.

The communique

that was drafted and initialed by both men was described by
one reporter as an act that appeared "as if both men were
heads of different governments." 8 It stated: "a very complete unanimity of view" prevailed in the discussions covering Korea, Japan, and United States policy in the Paoific. 9
After Inchon. military developments moved at an increased tempo.

On October 20, American troops captured

Pyongyang, the North Korean capi tr:tl; the next day United
States parachute troops landed deep inside North Korea.

Then

on October 28, Red Chinese elements were identified in North
Korea.. 10
On November 24, G-eneral Ma.cArthur launched an end-thewar offensive \1hich, on November 27, ran into an attack by
four Red Chinese armies that stalled and threw back the
drive.

On November 28, MacArthur said, wwe face an entirely

new war" because of the intervention of the Red Chinese
forces. 11
8 Gunther,

~·

£!!., p. 200.

9 Hearings, Part 5, pp. 3571-73.
10 Log.
11

ill·

~ ~

Times, November 29, 1950.

15
These events led the New !.Q.tls Times reporter Arthur
Krock to make the following inquiry of General MacArthur: 12
Ans\vering critic ism for military action beyond Thirtyeighth Parallel or .Pyongyang some officials here saying
for non-attribution but for publication that every time
such stop-point was suggested you replied you would not
accept responsibility for security of your troops if decision was made; that this faced authorities with dilemma of taking risk replacing you with elections coming on
or letting you proceed against their political and diplomatic judgment and against some high military judgments
also.
In reply General MacArthur sent the following message: 1 3

Reference query contained in your radio of the twentyninth. There is no validity whatsoever to the anonymous
gossip to which you refer. Every strategic and tactical
movement made by the United Nations Command has been in
complete accordance with United Nations resolutions and
in compliance with the directives under which I operate,
every lJ'l.ajor step having been previously reported and
fully approved.
I have received no suggestions from any authoritative
source that in the execution of its mission the Command
should stop at the Thirty-eighth Parallel or J.lyongyang,
or at any other line short of the international boundary.
To have done so would have required revision of the resolutions of the United Nations and the directives re•
ceived in implementation thereof.

It is historically inaccurate to attribute any degree
of responsibility for the onslaught of the Chinese Communists armies to the strategic course of the campaign
itself. The decision by the Chinese Communist leaders to
wage war against the United Nations could only have been
a basic one, long premeditated and carried into execution
12 New .I.Q!! 'fimes, December 1, 1950.

· · Hearings, Part 5-,

13

-P~

3495.

Times, December 1, 1950.
Hearings, Part 5, p. 3496.

~X£!!

16

as direct result of the defeat of their satellite North
Korean armies. Thanks for bringing this misleading
anonymous gossip to my attention.
Obviously there were political implications involved
in this, and the political and military considerations overlapped each other.

MacArthur was in a position to hold,

with good reason, that his forces were not secure unless
they crossed the Thirty-eighth Parallel.

Carrying the war

to the enemy was no new military concept, and by doing so he
protected his own forces.

However, this brought the Chinese

Communists into the war, and the
them.

sa~e

reasoning applied to

Beyond the Yalu River they could build up supplies of

men and materiel.

This was not acceptable to MacArthur.

Nevertheless, our planes were not permitted to follow, even
in hot pursuit across the Manchurian border.
From this point on, the record indicates that MacArthur could not accept this concept of fighting a war, at
least not this war.

He probably arrived at this decision

sometime earlier, but we are concerned with the events that
took place and the reasons for them.

He went over the heads

of his superiors, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the President, and took his case to the people through the press and
public statements.
>vii th

On December 1, 1950, in an interview

reporters of th.e magazine !l..:..§..

~ ~

World Report,

the follo\ving questions and answers were made:
Q.

Are the limitations which prevent unlimited

17

pursuit of Chinese large forces and unlimited attack on
their bases regarded by you as a handicap to effective
military operations?

A. An enormous handicap without precedent in military history.
Q. Nine out of ten persons on the street here and
throughout the country are asking why the atom bomb is
not being used. Can anything be said as to the effectiveness of the bomb in the type of operation in which
you are now engaged?

A.

My comment would be inappropriate at this time. 14

On the same day MacArthur also sent a message to Hugh
Bailliet President of the United Press, which said, in
part: 15
l''rom the initiation of the North Korean aggression
against the Republic of Korea until the total defeat of
the North Korean armies, support from the Communist
Chinese from behind the privileged sanctuary of neutral
boundaries was open and notorious and all-inclusive.
On December 6, 1950, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised MacArthur of a Presidential order, issued to all cabinet members and other top government officials, requiring
the clearance of speeches, press releases, and other statements concerning military policy and foreign relations.
Military commanders and diplomatic representatives were
directed to use extreme caution in public statements and
to refrain from direct communication on military or foreign

14 !h.§.. ~!World Report, December 8, 1950, p. 16.
Hearings, Part 5, PP• 3532-33.

15 l]!Q., PP• 3534-35.

18
policy with newspapers, magazines, or other publicity media
in the United States. 16
By this time the controversy was front page news all
over the nation.

At a press conference on January 11, 1951,

President Truman denied that there was any curb on MacArthur's authority to speak freely on the Korean War.

At

MacArthur's headquarters the directive was interpreted as
applying solely to formal public statements and not to communiques, correspondence, or personal conversations with
others. 17
Without the Chinese Cornmunists in the war North Korea
was defeated, but the "new war" that MacArthur spoke of
found the United Nation forces driven back to the vicinity
of the Thirty-eighth Parallel.

In :F'ebruary the General had
this to say about holding the battle line at this point: 18
The concept advanced by some that we should establish a line across Korea and enter into positional warfare is wholly unrealistic and illusory. It fails completely to take into account the length of such a line
at the narrowest lateral, the rugged terrain which is
involved and the relatively small force which could be
committed to the purpose. The attempt to engage in such
strategy would insure destruction of our forces piecemeal. Talk of crossing the Thirty-eighth Parallel at

16 ~., P• 3536.
17 u.s. News.~ World Report. "Faqts Behind the_M_ae_- __
Arthur-Truman Mix-up, '1 April 27, 1951, p. 15.

18 New!£!! Times, February 14, 1951.
Hearings, Part 5, p. 3539.

19

the present stage of the campaign, except by scattered
patrol action incidental to the tactical situation, is
purely academic.
From a. military standpoint we must materially reduce
the existing superiority of our Chinese Communist enemy
engaging with impunity in undeclared war against us,
with the unprecedented military advantage and sanctuary
protection for his military potential against our
counterattack upon Chinese soil, before we can seriously
consider conducting major operations north of that geographic line.
Judging from this statement one would think that the
General felt he had two adversaries; one in Korea, and the
other in

\~lashington.

'l'his statement was obviously an at-

tempt to use his influence in order to fight the Chinese as
he thought best.

He apparently saw the handwriting on the

wall, and opposed, in advance, ending the war at the Thirtyeighth Parallel.

However, this is not the kind of battle

communique that gives the status of military operations as
of a certain date.

Even so, this statement was not to arouse

as much controversy as later "communiques."

On March 7, the United Nations troops recaptured
Seoul for the last time.

General MacArthur then made one of

his most important statements on the Korean War, in part as
follows: 19

Assuming no diminution of the enemy's flow of ground
forces and materiel to the Korean battle area, a continuation of the existing limitation upon our freedom of

19 Hearings, Part 5, p. 3450.
~ !£r! Times, March 8, 1951.
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counter-offensive action, and no major additions to our
organizational strength, the battle lines cannot fail in
time to reach a point of theoretical military stalemate.
Thereafter our further advance would militarily benefit
the enemy more than it would ourselves.
Vital decisions have yet to be made--decisions far
beyond the scope of authority vested in me as the military commander, decisions which are neither solely political nor solely military, but which must provide on the
highest international levels an answer to the obscurities
which now becloud the unsolved problems raised by Red
China's undeclared war in Korea.
The New York Times said that State Department people
were not exactly delighted with General MacArthur's use of
the word "stalemate" and its implications of futility.

They

felt that the effort in Korea was exacting a price in casualties that the Chinese Government could not go on paying
forever. 20 However, MacArthur's point was that it was the
Chinese, and not the United States, who could afford the
price in human life.
In

th~

United Nations most of the delegates inter-

preted the statement as an attempt to put pressure on the
United Nations to authorize MacArthur to bomb Chinese supply
bases and industries in Manchuria.

The United States' rep-

resentative moved quickly to end such fears and said that
MacArthur's statement should be viewed as an "analysis" and
not a "recommendation."

20

~

"Any recommendations to the United

!£!k Times, March 11, 1951.
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Nations, 11 he said, "would come from Washington." 21
This message also said a great deal more than the ordinary battle communique.

By implication it criticized the

United Nations for the "obscurities which becloud the unsolved problems raised by China's entry into the war."

The

"vital decisions yet to be made" clearly blamed Washington
and the United Nations for the lack of a clear-cut victory
in Korea.

The decision had been made.

The United Nations

and Washington did not wait from the date of the Chinese entry into the war in October, until March, when MacArthur
made this statement, without having a plan of action.

How-

ever, this plan was a negative one; it was based on the idea
of containment, of limiting the war to Korea, and of not
tru{ing the risk of spreading the war into China.
In the United Nations the idea of unifying Korea by
military action was quietly dropped.

The General Assembly

resolution of October 7, which tacitly authorized the crossing of the Thirty-eighth Parallel by United Nations forces
and the importance of unification of the whole country, was
being pushed deeper into the background. 22
The next phase of the controversy took place during
the United Nations grinding offensive that slowly pushed the

21 Ibid., "Atmosphere at the U.N.," p. E-1.
22 New

X2I!

Times, April 15, 1951.
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Chinese Communists back toward the Thirty-eighth Parallel.
Intelligence reports indicated that the Chinese were massing
in North Korea and Manchuria for a major drive.

The four-

teen United Nations countries with troops in Korea were
working for a statement of aims that would induce Nao 'l'setung to consider a truce proposal.

On March 20 1 1951, the

Joint Chiefs of Staff sent General NacArthur the following
message: 23
State planning Presidential announcement shortly
that, \vi th clearing of bulk of Sout.h Korea of aggression, United Nations now prepared to discuss conditions
of settlement in Korea. Strong UN feeling persists that
further diplomatic effort to\vard settlement should be
made before any advance with major forces north of 38th
Parallel. Time will be required to determine diplomatic
reactions and permit new negotiations that may develop.
Recognizing that parallel has no military significance,
~Jtate has asked JCS what authority you should have to
permit sufficient freedom of action for next few weeks
to provide security for U.N. forces and maintain contact
with enemy. Your recommendations desired.
Just four days later, March 24, without consulting
\lla.shington, the General issued another in this unusual series of communiques.

It is .f.illlazing in light of the March 20

message of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

However, he had ap-

parently reached the limit of his patience.

He noted that

the Chinese "human wave tactics" had failed, and that Red
China lacked the industry to fight a modern war.
23

~

.IQ.rk Herald Tribune, April 12, 1951.
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The com-

23

munique then stated: 24
The enemy therefore must by now be painfully aware
that a decision of the United Nations to depart from its
tolerant effort to contain the war to the area of Korea
through expansion of our military operations to his
coastal areas and interior bases would doom Red China to
the risk of in~inent military collapse • • • •
Within the area of my authority as military comm;.).nder,
however, it should be needless to say I stand ready at
any time to confer in the field with the commander in
chief of the enemy forces in an earnest effort to find
any military means whereby the realization of the political objectives of the United Nations in Korea, to which
no nation may justly take exceptions, might be accomplished without further bloodshed.
This message coupled an implied threat and an offer to
discuss truce terms.

The New York Times said the statement,
"caused dismay and anger at the U.N. and in Washington." 25

At the President's direction the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent
General MacArthur a message which sternly called attention to
the December 6, directive advising him and all other commanders to steer away from foreign and military policy statements until they had been cleared by Washington.
General Courtney Whitney, one of the men closest to
MacArthur since the fall of the Philippines, later said: "The
General has interpreted • • • his statement of March 24 • • •
as dealing exclusively with the military situation and within

24 New!£!! Times, March 24, 1951; reprinted
April 12, 1951.
Hearings, Part 5, pp. 3541-42.
25 New York Times, April 15, 1951, p. E-1.
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his uncontested authority to speak." 26
Then on April 5, 1 951, the Minority Leader of the
House of Representatives, Joseph Martin, read a letter to
Congress from General MacArthur.
ter from Congressman l•1artin.

This was a reply to a let-

·This exchange • and in particu-

lar 1'-iacArthur•s letter, furnish the climax in the dispute
over our policy in Korea.
Congressman Martin's letter, dated March 8, 1951; was
as follows: 27
General of the Army Douglas MacArthur,
Commander in Chief, Far Eastern Command.
My Dear General: In tho current discussions on for~
eign policy and overall strategy many of us have been
distressed that • • • we have been without the views of
yourself as Commander in Chief of the Far Eastern Comround.
I think it is imperative to tile security of our rqation and for the safety of the world that policies of
tr1e United States embrace the broadest possible strategy
and that in our earnest desire to protect Europe we not
weaken our position in Asia.
Enclosed is a copy of an address I delivered in
Brooklyn, N.Y., February 12, stressing this vital point
and suggesting that tl1e forces of Generalissimo Chiang
Kai-shek on li'ormosa might be employed in the opening of
a second Asiatic front to relieve the pressure on our
forces in Korea.
I have since repeated tile essence of thiB thesis in
other speeches, and intend to do so again on March 21,
when J will be on a radio hook-up.
I Hould deem it a great help if I could have your
views on this point, either on a confidential basis or
otherwise. Your admirers a.re legion, and the respect

26 u.s.~~ World Report, April 27, 1951, P• 15.
27 Hearings, Part 5, P• 3543; reprinted from the

Congressional Record, April 13, 1951, p. 3938.
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you command is enormous. May success be yours in the
gigantic undert~{ing which you direct.
Sincerely yours,
Joseph w. Martin, Jr.
The reply of General filacArthur, March 20, 1951,
read: 28
Hon. Joseph w. Martin, Jr.
House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.
Dear Congressman Martin: I am most grateful for your
note of the 8th forwarding me a copy of your address of
February 12. The latter I have read with much interest,
and find that with the passage of years you have certainly lost none of your old-time punch.
My views and recommendations with respect to the situation created by Red China's entry into war against us
in Korea have been submitted to \vashington in most complete detail. Generally these views are well known and
clearly understoodt as they follow the conventional
pattern of meeting force with maximum counter-force as
we have never failed to do in the past. Your view with
respect to the utilization of the Chinese forces on Formosa is in conflict with neither logic nor this tradition.
It seems strangely difficult for some to realize that
here in Asia is where the Communist conspirators have
elected to make their play for global conquestt and that
we have joined the issue thus raised on the battlefield;
that here we fight Europe's war with arms while the diplomats still fight with words; that if we lose the war
to communism in Asia the fall of l!:urope is inevitable,
win it and Europe most probably would avoid war and yet
preserve freedom. As you pointed out, we must win.
There is no substitute for victory.
With renewed thanks and expressions of most cordial
regard, I am,
Faithfully yours,
Douglas MacArthur.

28 Hearings, Part 5, p. 3543.
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CHAPTER III
THE BACKGHOUND OF THE HBARINGS

-How

-

General MacArthur was .;;;,..;;..;;;...;;;....fired.

On the afternoon of

April 12, 1951 (Tokyo time), General and Mrs. MacArthur were
just finishing lunch at the Embassy with a visiting United
States Senator when the General's aide, Colonel Sidney Huff,
telephoned for Mrs. MacArthur.

A radio broadcast had just

announced that the General had been relieved of all of his
corumands.

Colonel Huff knew that Mrs. MacArthur could help

more than anyone else in this very awkward situation.

A

little later the official message from Washington was received and delivered by the aide.

It was dated April 10,
1951 (Washington time), and read as follows: 1
I deeply regret that it becomes my duty as President
and Commander in Chief of the United States military
forces to replace you as Supreme Commander, Allied Powers; Commander in Chief, United Nations Command; Commander in Chief, Far East; ·and Commanding General, u.s.
Army, Far East.
You will turn over your commands, effective at once,
to Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway. You are authorized to
have such orders as are necessary to complete desired
travel to such place as you select.
My reasons for your replacement will be made public
concurrently with the delivery to you of the foregoing
order, and are contained in the next following message.
The message explaining the President's action read: 2
With deep regret I have concluded that General of the
Army Douglas t4acArthur is unable to give his whole1 Hearings, Part 5, p. 3546.

2

~ ••

p. 3547.
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hearted support to the policies of the United States
Government and of the United Nations in matters pertaining to his official duties. In view of the specific
responsibilities imposed upon me by the Constitution of
the United States and the added responsibility which has
been entrusted to me by the United Nations, I have decided that I must make a change of command in the Far
East. I have, therefore, relieved General MacArthur of
his commands and have designated Lt. Gen. Matthew B.
Ridgway as his successor.
Full and vigorous debate on matters of national policy is a vital element in the constitutional system of
our free democracy. It is fundamental, however, that
military commanders must be governed by the policies and
directives issued to t:wm in the manner provided by our
lmvs and constitution. In time of crisis, this consideration is particularly compelling.
General MacArthur's place in history as one of our
greatest commanders is fully established. The nation
owes him a debt of gratitude for the distinguished and
exceptional service which he has rendered his country
in posts of great responsibility. For that reason I
repeat my regret at the necessi t;v for the action I feel
compelled to take in his case.
~

reaction .Qf ..:!ill.§. J2Ublic.

reaction was enormous.

The extent of the public

In New York, Mayor Impelleteri an-

nounced that the city would honor the General with the traditional ticker tape parade.

From Tokyo, General MacArthur

cabled his acceptance of New York's honors.

He also noti-

fied the Senate Armed Services Committee that he thought it
"inappropriate" for him to appear as a witness while Congress was considering an invitation to him to address the
·Congress as a whole.

He said he wanted to talk to Congress

in ng~meral terms. n3

3

~!2.!:!f
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A large part of the press supported ivlacArthur', but it
cannot be assumed that this was an accurate reflection of
public opinion.

However, the press does influence public

opinion, and the attitude of the press is an important consideration.

The influential ma.gazine Time said of the sit-

uation:4
Seldom had a more unpopular man :fired a more popular
one. Douglas MacArthur was the personification of the
big man • • • Harry 1'ruman was almost a professional
little rnanj with admirers who liked his courage and
critics who despised his faults.
Howeverj an Associated Press survey of seventy-eight
leading newspapers in all parts of the country showed this
division of opinion: Truman right, thirty-eight; Trurru;m
wrong, twenty-six; neutral- fourteen.5
The

~

York 'l'imes reported that ne\vspaper comment

generally reflected the following major themes:·6
( 1 ) Civil vs. military control of policy.
(2) What world policy do we have?

(a) Europe first ot,

('b) Stop Communism in Asia now.

( 3) The President's Asian policy; whether or not he
has been Vf.teilln.ting.

(4) .F'ersonali ties.

Is Truman doing his job? Is MacArthur a 'far-seeing statesman,' or a 'dangerous
egoist?'
(5) Secretary of State Acheson's role and charges of
'appeasement' of the United Nations and Communist China.

4

~,

April 23, 1951, p. 24.

5 fu !.Q.r.!£ Times, April 15, 1951, P• E:-5.
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Across the nation newspaper editorials generally took
a pro-MacArthur and anti-Administration view.

the~

A survey by

.!..Q1j£ Times 7 reported that the Philadelphia Evening

Bulletin (Independent) said, "A general in the Orient could
not be allowed to determine global policies in the light of
facts. contacts, and consultations not available to anybody
in Japan or Korea."

In New York the Dail;y:

~(Independent)

said, " • • • the entire Korean \var situation stinks to heaven," and thought it was MacArthur's duty to tell the American
people all he knew about "little Harry Truman's police action."

The

Minneapolis~

(Independent) called the Korean

War a "tragic blunder," but warned against embracing MacArthur's policies.

The survey showed the Cleveland News

(Republican) holding, "In the hearts of Americans at this
hour General MacArthur is the real conqueror, and a President
of the United States had, by his ill judgment and compromised
position, emerged defeated."

In Dallas the Daill Times-

Herald (Independent-Democrat) agreed that MacArthur had to
go, but said: "The enemies of freedom can sit complacently
and smile at our confusion. 11

The New Orleans States (Inde-

pendent-Democrat) was most outspoken: "we could much better
have lost the whole national Administration at Washington
than this able commander, statesman, organizer, and leader."

7

.!!U:J!.,

P• E-3·
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The Pacific Coast was more sensitive to Asian developments
than any other part of the country, and the public was
shocked.

However, there were many voices to support the

President, and the press seemed more temperate than the public, though editorials expressed great fears of disastrous
consequences.

The

~

Angeles Times (Republican) called the

President's move "horribly bad judgment • • • the most powerful nation in the world has listened to the mewlings of
its impotent allies and has thrown in with the appeasers."
The

noted~~

Times political commentator.

Arthur Krock, wrote: 8
It is probably too muoh to expect the Republicans
not to try to make a quick harvest of the sudden crop of
popular anger, the potential of trouble and danger for
the free world is large.
Another Times writer, Hanson

w.

Baldwin, predicted that the

change would result in smoother command and staff relationships, and that the "Bataan crowd" would be replaced by Pentagon direction.9
Probably the person to whom the public reaction meant
the most was the President.
reaction would be?

What did he expect the public

The answer was given at the Blair House

conference of April 10, which was the final meeting before
MacArthur•s dismissal.
8

~

There was a discussion of the prob-

!2Ik Times, April 15, 1951, p. E-3.

9 !£!g., P• E-4.
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able public reaction,

a.nd

the conferees anticipated there

would be an uproar in Congress and that the first response
from the public would be adverse.

Nevertheless, President

Truman observed, "If your decision is right you must go
ahead \vi th it even if you know there will be a storm of disapproval.

If you are right, the Mnerican people will in
time support you." 10
Public reaction was all that the President and his

advisers expected it would be.

Arthur Krock wrote, "The

dismissal inevitably projected General MacArthur onto the
national political stage from a position in the wings. 1111
Huge crowds turned out in Hawaii and San Francisco.

An es-

timated 100,000 persons appeared before the San Francisco
City Hall to hear the General say, "I have no political aspirations whatsoever.
ical office.

I do not intend to run for any polit-

I hope that my name will never be used in any

political way. 1112
In Washington, at President Truman's directive, all
government departments and agencies dismissed :for the afternoon all employees whose duties could be spared.
a million people watched the welcoming events.

About half
The turn-

out in New York was twice as large as that which greeted
10

~.,

p. E-1.

12

~~Times,

11

~.,

p. E-3.

April 15, 1951, p. 1.
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Genoral Eisenhower on his return from Europe.
As of ,\pril 17, thH public response waa runni.ng
tM;

Congressiond.l mai.l and tal-

hH~s

f::.oftly cind hope that sucil a

<:l[;aim;t tho President insofar

ta.c tic wa.e to speaf( moru or

r~,.:;a.ction vJould. t~iko place. 1 3
of public opinion, the
~ !!.m.~

reviewed foreign press statements.

~

In t;ngland

the !1ancl1ester Gug:u:ctia.p, after saying, H.Prosident Truman
• • • is wholly in tho

ritsht," added ttu1t,

"!~acA.rthur

had at

times been loft to take difficult decisions with a lamentable la,ok of pol! tica.l guidance from s ta.tesmon whose task
it should have been to give it.'*

The conservative Daj;li£

.B}f:nreaa took is!:me with the President's decision.

Said the

Expres~t "Is he [Gonera.l Hidgwai} also to be told by the
lAake Success lollipops that he can do anything he wants.

to the Chinese except hurt them"?" 14

• •

Generally, though, the

Hri tish people and government disagreed with HaoArthur.

'.rhey

opposed u.ny naval blockade of China because it would be ineffective, and they felt that using the

troopt.~

of Chiang Kai-

shek or bombing China would lead to atl extension of the wtar.

13

~ York Time§, April 17, 1951, p. 8.

14 New

~

'rimes, April 15, 1951, p. E-5.
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Furthermore, they openly favored seating Red China in the
In the House ot Commons there was cheering
at the announcement of General MacArthur's removal. 15

United Nations.

In Rome, :F'oreign Hinister Count Carlo Sforza said the
President had done "an excellent thing."
government thought it a "wise" move.

The Netherlands

At the United Nations

in New York there was polite but undisguised elation.

The

Indian delegation said: "It should improve the atmosphere."
In Peiping a Chinese Communist paper wryly observed• "We do
not see any significance in MacArthur's dismissal • • • •
One mad devil has lost favor with the boss and is being replaced vii th another." 16
I.lli2, reaction

2!.

Congress.

Both Democrats and Repub-

licans joined in praising General MacArthur for his statement that he did not intend to enter politics.

Senator

Wherry, Republican of Nebraska and Minority Leader of the
Senate, said: 17
This should put a stop to
etmen who have been dragging
the great decision that must
tional defense policy should

all the snipers and hatchMacArthur politically into
be made on what our nabe.

Senator Johnson, Democrat of Colorado, said, "He can

15

~York

--

Times, April 15, 1951, p. E-2.

16 Loc. cit.

17

~York

Times, April 19, 1951, p. 10.
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now be regarded as a patriot instead of a politician." 18
House Minority Leader Martin said that the MacArthur
statement was "no news to me," then added:

"General Mac-

Arthur had previously told some of his friends he was not
interested in politics.

He is only trying to be of genuine

service to the country • • • • u19
Senator Lehman, Democrat of New York, said he was
"glad that General MacArthur rejected any idea of engaging
in political activity." 20
Senator Benton, Democrat of Connecticut, said, "I
congratulate him on his decision and I think this means
he'll be even more influential." 21
Republican Senator Ferguson of Michigan said that
the announcement was just what he expected and that: 22
Republicans here should not speak for General MacArthur, nor should he be spokesman for the party.
Congress should get as many facts from him as possible
to formulate proper policies.
Meanwhile, on April 12, 1951, Senator Robert A. Taft,
Republican party leader in the Senate, in a speech before
.the Yale Engineering Association in New York, accused the
President of usurping Congressional authority when he sent
American troops into Korea without first getting approval.
18

~

!2!! Times, April 19, 1951, p.10.
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Furthermore, he noted that the President's position was not
consistent, since the firing of MacArthur led the world to
believe that we were "flirting with appeasement," while at
the same time we were trying to prevent World War III by our
move against Korean aggression. 2 3
Other Congressional comment was in much the same
vein -- pro-MacArthur from both Republicans and Democrats.
Undoubtedly some of the Democrats were waiting for a turn in
the tide of public opinion.

It v1ould have been politically

unwise to oppose it at this time.
For a short time Republican House Leader Martin
talked about impeachment.

Senator Kerr, Democrat of Okla-

horna, accused the Republicans of dodging the real issue and
said that if they believed the nation should follow MacArthur's policy they should submit a resolution expressing
that as the sense of the Senate.

Senator Humphrey, Demo-

crat of Minnesota, said, "The Republican Party has become
the war party.n 24 The talk of impeachment was dropped.
However, that did not mean the Republicans were going
to abandon so much political ammunition.

Within the

~arty

itself a change of tactics was needed to insure support of
Republicans in Congress.

Eastern internationalists, like

23 Sen. Robert A. Taft, "The Korean War and the MacArthur Dismissal," Vital Speeches, XVII No. 14, May 1, 1951,
pp. 420-22.
24

~'

April 23, 1951, P• 26.
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Senator Lodge, and men like Senator Knovtland who wan ted decisive action in Asia, as well as such isolationists as
Indiana's Capehart and Illinois' Dirksen, who frequently
criticized involvement in either Europe or Korea, were all
needed for effective party unity.

A Presidential election

was coming up in 1952, and the firing of MacArthur seemed, at
this time, to accrue to the benefit of the Republicans.

As

a result Representative Martin announced that the Republican
Party would move to have MacArthur address a joint session
of Congress.

In addition to the Republican opposition in Congress
the President had considerable opposition from within his own
party.

This came from Southern Democrats who took issue with

the President's stand on civil rights and transferred this
attitude into general opposition of his politics.
On April 19, 1951, General MacArthur addressed a joint
meeting of Congress.

In this he was free to speak over the

head of the President, but he had already done that.
was probably his greatest hour.

The

~

lined, "20 Million View General over TV."

This

Y2.!:!f Times headAccording to the

Times, this was more than nwitnessed the Senate crime investigation."

Furthermore, "viewers saw a man who not only

had strong convictions, but also displayed an intuitive stage
presence and a keen awareness of his dramatic hour." 2 5

25

m
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Interest in the address was so great that many television and radio stations changed their schedules to offer
repeat broadcasts on films and recordings.
ing to the

~

However, accord-

12!:!£ Times, "TV cameramen gave fine shots of

Republicans applauding, but no direct, full-screen views of
the Democrats just sitting quietly."

The Times concluded

that "both reportorial accuracy and dramatic contrast called
for better judgment by the cameramen or directors." 26
The General's speech raised several questions and kept
the dispute very much alive.

He said that the Joint Chiefs

of Staff had agreed with him.

It followed that members of

the Senate Armed Services Com..rni ttee would want to hear more
about that.
The demand f2! §U investigation £x Congress.

Both

parties agreed there should be an investigation of foreign
policy.

In addition to the immediate reason, brought on by

the General's dismissal, there was the problem of troops for
Europe--the so called "great debate" of 1950-51.

In its

broader aspects, this was a logical development of the differences involved in the

11

Europe first" policy of Roosevelt

and Churchill in World War II, with which MacArthur had disagreed.27
26

The final and probably the most pressing reason
~York

Times, April 20, 1951, p. 6.

27 ~ :F'orrestal Diaries, Walter Millis, editor (New
York: The Viking Press, 1951), pp. 17-18.

for an investigation was that intense public interest demanded it.

These circumstances put Congress in a difficult

position.

In the first place it was the duty of Congress to

investigate the situation since in involved the safety of the
nation, hut a really objective analysis required that the investigators subordinate political considerations to national
security.
Of less vital importance, but not to be overlooked,
v.ras the manner in which the General was dismissed.

A Con-

gressional investigation was not needed to prove it had been
bungled, but an explanation of it was in order.

To many Re-

publicans it was typical of the way everything in Washington
was being handled, and it contained all the elements of a
political bombshell.
Arrangements for the Hearings themselves had interesting and important political overtones.

The Democrats

wanted closed hearings and wanted to use the standing commi ttees on l1ili tary Affairs and Foreign Relations.

~

magazine said that the Democrats were anxious "to keep General MacArthur's thundering rhetoric out of the earshot of
microphones and his dramatic profile off the screen of
twelve million television sets." 28

Commenting on Time's

28 Richard H. Rovere and Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.,
The General and the President (New York: Farrar, Straus, and
Young, 1951)~.-r?s.
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observation, Rovere and Schlesinger said that while 11m! was
no doubt correct,

» •

• • the case did not rest entirely on

the audio-visual delights of General MacArthur; it also
rested on the same logic which holds that jewels should be
kept in a safe." 29 After five votes a compromise was reached
in which the Democrats yielded on procedure to the extent
that the Hearings could be attended by all members of the
Senate• v1ith questioning limited to committee members; there
would be no broadcasting or televising, but an effort would
be made to give the press whatever parts of the testimony the
Defense Department could, in good conscience, release.3°

29 ~·· p. 178.
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CHAPTER IV
FACTS ABOUT THE HEARINGS

!h!

Committee--~!!~

constituted.

Sitting

jointly, the Senate Committees on Armed Services and Foreign
Relations brought together most of the principal leaders of
both parties under the chairmanship of Senator Richard Russell, Democrat of Georgia.

Representing the Armed Services

Committee were: Senators Byrd• Democrat of Virginia; Hunt,
Democrat of Wyoming; Johnson, Democrat of Texas and Majority
Leader in the Senate; Kefauver, Democrat of Tennessee;
Stennis, Democrat of Mississippi; Long, Democrat of Louisiana; Bridges, Republican of New Hampshire; Saltonstall, Republican of Massachusetts; Morse, Republican of Oregon;
Knowland, Republican of California; Cain, Republican of
Washington; and Flanders, Republican of Vermont.

Members of

the Committee on Foreign Relations were: Senators Connally,
Democrat of Texas and committee chairman; George, Democrat
of Georgia; Green, Democrat of Rhode Island; McMahon, Democrat of Connecticut; Fulbright, Democrat of Arkansas;
Sparkman, Democrat of Alabama; Gillette, Democrat of Iowa;
Wiley, Republican of Wisconsin; Smith, Republican of New
Jersey; Hickenlooper, Republican of Iowa; Lodge, Republican
of Massachusetts; Tobey, Republican of New Hampshire; and
Brewster, Republican of Maine.

This resulted in fourteen

41

Democrats and twelve Republicans. 1
The extent to which politics entered into the committee's line of questioning is a matter of some speculation,
but it was, nevertheless, a factor that must be studied and
evaluated.

While the committee had a Democratic majority,

seven o:f them were Southern Dixiecrats. 2

On the other hand,

Republican Senator Morse frequently split with his own party
to support the Administration viewpoint.
These two committees brought together two of the most
important Congressional groups.

Under their wing was con-

trol of the defense budget, about two-thirds of all federal
expenditures, and the increasingly difficult problems of
foreign affairs.

The importance attributed to the work of

these committees is indicated by the seniority of members
assigned to them.

Senator George was elected to the Senate

in 1922; Senator Russell was elected in 1932; Senator Byrd
was elected in 1933.

Senator Knowland was being groomed to

take over the Senatorial leadership of' the Hepublican Party.
The Senator most conspicuous for his absence from these
committees was Robert A. Taft, who preferred to devote
himself to leading the Republican Party in Congress and to
1 Heari!JBS, Part 1, P• ii.

2 Senators: Russell, Georgia; Byrd, Virginia; Johnson, Texas; Stennis, Mississippi; Long, Louisiana; George,
Georgia; Sparkman, Alabama.
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domestic affairs.

Senator Sparkman was to be the Democratic

Vice-Presidential choice in 1952.

Senator Morse was widely

known as a liberal Republican.

had gained a considerable

He

reputation on the West Coast as an arbitrator of labor disputes.

In 1943, Senator Fulbright introduced a resolution

in the House of Representatives which called for "the creation of appropriate international machinery with power adequate to establish and to maintain a just and lasting
peace." 3 Subsequently, Senator Fulbright became Chairman of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

A similar resolu-

tion was introduced in the Senate in 1943 by Senator Tom
Connally; the combination of these became known as the Connally-Fulbright resolution. 4
How

!h!

Hearings

~

conducted.

Because the testi-

mony concerned national security it was necessary that the
Hearings be closed to the public.

While neither the press

nor the public was admitted, arrangements were made to give
the press whatever testimony the Defense Department cleared.
Of course, Defense Department censorship was not what the
correspondents felt would result in the full coverage they
wanted.

According to Rovere and Schlesinger, most corre-

3 Richard B. Morris, editor, Encyclopedia 21 American
History {New York: Harper and Brothers, 1953), p. 382.

--

4 Loc. cit.
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spondents thought the system would be "unbearably clumsy,"
but it turned out to be

11

•••

the most thorough and accu-

rate coverage there has been of any Congressional hearing
within memory."5
A subcommittee on Censorship was made up of Senators
McMahon and Knowland with Admiral Arthur Davis representing
the Defense Department.

The censored transcripts were sent

to the Senate Office Building press room ordinarily within
an hour after the testimony had been given.

Whenever the

stenotypist in the hearing room had a few hundred words, his
ribbon was taken to the mimeograph room, where the text was
cut on a stencil.

The stencil was then given to Admiral

Davis with the advice of Adrian Fisher of the State Department.

Any material that would endanger national security

was cut out with a razor blade.

The mutilated stencil was

put on an electric duplicating machine which, sheet by
sheet, fed duplicates practically into the hands of the correspondents, who had arranged to purchase them.

The fee was

twelve and a half cents a sheet, and for a time there was a
brisk second-hand market at three cents a sheet.
there were a,ooo sheets. 6

All told,

Chairman Russell had some difficulty keeping the bal-

5 Rovere and Schlesinger, £2• cit., p. 179.
6 Ibid., p. 181.
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ance that would protect national security and at the same
time keep the American people well informed.

He

stated at

the beginning of the Hearings that the transcript should be
full and complete, and later he saidt "The American people
are entitled to every single piece of information that can
be safely spread on the public reoord." 7 However, he also
noted that two press reports quoted unidentified Senators on
evid.ence submitted to the committee which did not appear in
the released transcript.

At one point Senator Russell

criticized General Marshall for having "put the classification to practically all of your statements." 8 It turned
out, however, that only 3.8% of Marshall's testimQny was deleted, either by himself or the censors.

This compared to

1.4% of MacArthur's testimony.9
When the Hearings had been going on for three weeks
the New York Times observeda 10

-Our-friends and adversaries all over the world have

been able to listen to an exposition of our military and
diplomatic strategy such as has never been put on record
before by any other nation in history.
"!!tt

Commencing May 3, 1951, the Hearings lasted for seven
Over two million words of

weeks, ending June 27, 1951.

7 Hearings, Part 1, p. 682.
8 Ibid., P• 335.

9

~.,

10 Cited in Rovere and

P• 678.

Schlesinger,~.£!!.,

p. 181.
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testimony were taken from thirteen witnesses. 11

In an en-

deavor to make the Hearings non-partisan, the members of the
joint committee decided that no views or conclusions would
be stated as that of the majority or minority, but that the
committee members could file their own views and conclusions
with the Chairman.

Such views were printed in the

appendix. 12
The most controversial matter relating to procedure
that arose after the Hearings were underway occurred when
witnesses declined to answer on the grounds that the questions disturbed the confidential position of an adviser to
the President.

MacArthur was asked what transpired during

the private talk at Wake Island; he declined to answer and
was not challenged.

General Marshall also declined to an-

swer confidential questions about the President and himself
and was not challenged.

Bradley was questioned about a con-

ference between the President, General Marshall, General
Bradley, Secretary Acheson, and Mr. Harriman concerning the
dismissal of MacArthur, and he declined to answer for the
same reason.

In this case, however, there were several

strong objections from Republicans Wiley and Hiokenlooper.
Arguments in favor of Bradley's stand were: (1) it involved
11 Hearings, Part 5, p. 3567.

12 Ibid., P• 3559.
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a confidential relationship like lawyer-client and doctorpatient, and (2) the separation of powers of the government.
The principal

arb~ment

against Bradley's position was that

this was public business.

Chairman Russell ruled that

Bradley was not required to testify to this point, and Senator Wiley appealed the ruling to a vote of the Committee.
The ruling of the Chairman was sustained by a vote of eiehteen to eight.

Senators voting to uphold the ruling

\IJere:

George, Green, McMahon, Sparkman, Smith, Lodge, Connally,
Byrd, Johnson, Kefauver, Hunt, Stennis, I.,ong, Saltonstall,
Morse, and Flanders.
were:

Senators voting a.gainst the ruling

Fulbright, Gillette, Wiley, Hickenlooper, Brewster,

Bridges, Knowland, and Cain.

Senator Russell ruled that as
Chairman he should not vote on his own ruling. 13
The

witnesses~

appeared before

1h!

Committee.

General MacArthur was, of course, the principal witness.

His

military career was long and distinguished, though like his
father before him he quarreled with civilian authorities.

As

military governor of the Philippines, Major General Arthur
MacArthur disagreed with Governor General William Howard Taft
concerning the degree of civil government that should be
granted the Philippines.

Arthur MacArthur was in command of

13 Hearings, Part 2, pp. 870-73.
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the American forces during the Philippine revolt and did not
agree with Judge Taft that the Philippine people were ready
for civil government.

Since politics were involved in this

situation, part of Taft's job was to get the revolt off of
the front pages of the newspapers as quickly as possible. 14
Douglas MacArthur's military career was outstanding
from the day he entered West Point.
the top man of his class.

He graduated in 1903,

In \1orld War I he was chief of

staff of the Forty-second (Rainbow) Division; then as commander of the Eighty-fourth Infantry Brigade fought in the
Champagne-Marne and Aisne-Marne defensives, and in the Sainti4ihiel and Meuse-Argonne offensives.

In 1918 he was pro-

Inoted to the rank of brigadier general, and in 1919 was appointed Superintendent of West Point.

From 1922-25 he was in

command of the United States forces stationed in the Philippines.

This was followed by assignment as chief of the gen-

eral staff, 1930-35.

In the period of Japanese expansion

President Franklin Roosevelt (1935) appointed MacArthur head
of the American military commission to the Philippines.

The

purpose of the commission was to establish an extensive
training and defense plan for the Philippine Army.
Although he had retired from duty in 1939, he returned
to duty in July 1941 to command the United States armed
14

Hunt,~·£!!.,

pp. 27-29.
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J

forces in the Far East.

After the Japanese attack on Decem-

ber 7, 1941, he led the American resistance in the Philippines until March 1942, when President Roosevelt ordered him
to Australia to take comrnand of the Allied forces in the
Southwest Pacific.

From here and New Guinea he directed the

campaign that ultimately led to the liberation of the Philippines.

In December 1944, he was promoted to general of the

army--five star general--the army's highest rank.

With this

rank goes full pay for life, since he is considered to be on
permanent call.

After the surrender of Japan, MacArthur was

named Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) occupation forces. 15 He was seventy years old when he became the
United Nations Commander in Korea.
\vhen he ordered the dismissal of MacArthur, President
Truman was well aware that he was dealing with a popular hero
and an explosive political situation.

Consequently he did

not act until he felt there was no other alternative.
so, he did not have an easy time of it.

Even

This was partly be-

cause the Korean War was an unpopular war at home, and partly
because of the inept way the General was dismissed; but probably the chief difficulty lay in the character and personality of Douglas MacArthur.

In addition to his soldierly

qualities, he has been an eloquent and effective public
15

~/illoughby,

.21!•

ill•, P• 300.
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speaker.

In 1950, John Gunther wrote: 16

A five star general can pretty well make his own
rules, and nobody has ever excelled MacArthur in his
capacity to tear the guts out of a directive, but by
and large he is scrupulously careful to maintain military
proprieties.
Politics were not the only extraneous factors that
were involved in the Hearings; so too were the personalities
of the individuals concerned with these times and events.
The careers of Generals Marshall and MacArthur had crossed
and rivaled each other for many years.

At the time that Mac-

Arthur was dismissed as Supreme Commander in the Orient each
was a five star general.

Each had served under the other,

but at the crucial hour Marshall was Secretary of Defense.
Marshall came to the Army from Virginia Military Institute;
he was commissioned in 1902.

In World War I, \·lhen MacArthur

led the Rainbow Division to famous victories, Marshall was an
organizer, administrator, and planner of battles.
aide-de-camp to General Pershing.

He became

At the end of the \<far each

held the rank of colonel, but postwar reshuffling of rank
brought l\1arshall down to a captaincy while MacArthur became a
brigadier general.
During the years that MacArthur was Superintendent at
West Point, Commander at Manila, Commanding Officer of the
Fourth Corps Area, and finally Chief of Staff and a full gen-

16 Gunther, QE• £11., p. 15.
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eral, Marshall continued service with Pershing.

There were

assignments in China and long tours in the Army's schools as
a student or instructor.

Marshall knew that he would have to

have some field assignments to attain any real advancement.
In 1932 and 1933 he was given duty with troops, but the assigmnent was interrupted with orders to the Illinois National
Guard as inspector and instructor. 17 Marshall was bitterly
disappointed.

He took the unusual step of requesting the

Chief of Staff to assign him field duty, but he was ordered
to carry out the original assignment to the National Guard.
MacArthur was Chief of Staff at the time.

From this time on

there was bad feeling between them, but it cannot be said to
have influenced their military decisions.
After MacArthur's tour as Chief of Staff ended in
1935, Marshall rose rapidly.

In 1939 he became Chief of

Staff and a four star general, just in time to plan and carry
out America's great rearmament drive.

When World War II

started for the United States, Marshall was in command at the
Pentagon, and MacArthur was at Manila.

The two Generals dis-

agreed on strategy for the prosecution of the war.

Since

there was not enough equipment for a full-scale war in both
Europe and the Pacific, there had to be a division.

Europe

was given first call, and the Pacific had to wait.

MacArthur

17

U.s.~

& World Report, May 11, 1951, PP• 30-32.
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made no secret of his impatience.
After the war Marshall retired from the Army, but,
like MacArthur, when he was needed by the government he continued to serve.

President Truman sent him to China to try

to bring about a truce in the Chinese civil war.

The truce

did not materialize, and in a year Marshall came to doubt the
value of Chiang, his men, and his administrators.
After his return from China Marshall became Secretary
of State for two years.

He stressed the Europe-first policy

with the Marshall Plan, shut off aid to Chiang Kai-shek, and
pigeonholed the Wedemeyer Report that urged continued help to
Chiang.

MacArthur's views were passed over. 18
After the invasion of South Korea, Marshall was again

called from retirement to become Secretary of Defense.

Thus

the quiet and unassuming Marshall had kept pace with the
brilliant and dramatic MacArthur throughout their long careers.

The personal characteristics that made the differ-

ences between them were reflected in the methods that they
used and in the objectives they advocated.
One of the most controversial figures of President
Truman's cabinet was Secretary of State Dean Acheson.

Right-

ly or v1rongly he was a. constant target of the opposition.

In

defense of his Secretary of State, President Truman had this
18 .lll.!,g.' p. 33.

to say: 19
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History, I am sure, will list Dean Acheson among the
truly great Secretaries of State our nation has had.
Most of the criticism came from members of the Senate
sometimes called the "China First" bloc.
These men kept repeating the completely baseless
charge that, somehow, Acheson had brought about the
Communist victory in China, and they now charged that it
was Acheson who was depriving General MacArthur of the
means of gaining victory.
Graduated from Groton, Yale University, and Harvard
Law School, Acheson was given an education that very few
people could obtain.

find that the

Consequently, it was not surprising to

~· ~ ~

World Report found this back-

ground had set him apart from many in Congress with whom he
had to dea1. 20 This, however, did not impair his standing
,with the President.

It is interesting because the back-

grounds of Truman and Acheson were so different.
In his dealings with other people, Acheson unfortunately had a flair and a weakness for withering phrases when
the questions revealed a lack of knowledge or slowness to
understand his viewpoint.

At one point in the Hearings Sen-

a tor J!,landers said that Mr. Acheson "was using his 'papa
kno\vs best' style to a bad advantage. 1121

No doubt some of

this was politics, and would have happened to anyone who was

19

~magazine,

20

!!.:..2.•

February 13, 1956, p. 71.

~,?!World

Report, June 15, 1951, p. 34.
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Secretary of State at the time.

1

Since the end of World

War II the State Department had increased greatly in importance.

It could not move without getting strong reactions,

both favorable and unfavorable.

In the postwar period Na-

tionalist China fell to the Communists.

Hany people in the

United States were very critical of the roles played by both
Acheson and Marshall.

Marshall was sent to China when Ambas-

sador Hurley resigned, with instructions to try to bring
about a coalition government in which Chiang Kai-shek would
permit Communists in both the government and the army of Nationalist China.

The result was that the Republicans were

able to mark him as the symbol of United States difficulties
in the Far East.

Five years previously China was in friendly

hands, then it fell into the hands of a shooting enemy.
Besides these knotty problems, Senator McCarthy's charges of
communists in the State Department created additional trouble.22
Relations between MacArthur and Acheson had been
strained since 1945.

MacArthur had announced that within six

months after the occupation of Japan started, a reduction of
forces from the original estimate of 500,000 to 200,000 could
be made.

At a press conference Acheson countered with,

"· •• the occupation forces are instruments of policy and

22

Ihi£.,

p. 32.
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not determinants of policy • • • and whatever it takes to
carry this out will be used • • • • 11 23
During World War II, Franklin Roosevelt was in many
respects his own Secretary of State, but after his death that
office again became the real source of American foreign policy, subject to Presidential approval.

Acheson became Under

Secretary in 1945 for Secretary of State James Byrnes.

The

opponents of the Truman Administration, Republican and Democrat, vJere able to link Acheson with a group of ul tra-liberals then working in the State Department.

According to

Frazier Hunt, it was he who assigned John Carter Vincent as
head of the Far Eastern Section of the State Department.
Acheson also made John Ste'wart Service head of the State Department Information Service.

In addition, the fact that

Alger Hiss and Owen Lattimore were State Department men was
condemned. 24
The truth was that the Republican campaign against
Acheson, fairly or not, marked him as the symbol of the difficulties of the United States in the Far East.

He had be-

friended Hiss, but so had John J?oster Dulles and ]'elix Frankfurter.

Acheson became something of a political albatross

to the Democrats.

As a matter of fact many Republicans con-

23 Hunt, .212•

24

~.,

.£ll.,

PP• 411-12.

PP• 415-16.
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sidered him a political asset to their cause. 25

However, on

the stand Acheson was to be coldly logical, calm, and unemotional.

He had a lawyer's skilled command of himself, and

was exceedingly careful not to be clever, apparently realizing that a debater's victory often costs more support than
it wins.
The principal military advisers of the President were,
of course, the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Their function was

twofold: they advised the President on military matters, and
each was administrator of his respective branch of the armed
forces.

They were necessarily concerned with the balance of

forces needed to protect us and our friends from Soviet
aggression.

The disposition of our forces became the subject

of much Congressional controversy in 1951.
not so much what to do, but how to do it.

The question was
There was and is

an area here where military and foreign policy overlap, and
this was the crux of the MacArthur controversy.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff were made up of General Omar
Bradley, Chairman; General J. Lawton Collins, Army; General
Hoyt

s.

Vandenberg, Air Force; and Admiral Forrest Sherman,

Navy.

General Bradley enjoyed a very considerable reputa-

tion.

During World War II, he was in the African and Sicily

campaigns; in 1944 he led the United States First Army in25

~·~!World

Reuort, June 15, 1951, pp. 32-34.
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vasion of Normandy; and in 1944, was placed in command of the
newly created Twelfth Army Corps, in which position his
skillful planning hastened the defeat of Germany.
48 he was head of the Veterans Administration.
replaced General

Eisenho~tJer

From 1945-

In 1948, he

as Army Chief of Staff and in

1949, became the Chairman of the newly formed Joint Chiefs of
Staff.

Senator Russell described him as a man of "great

humanity and great humility; the GI's general. 1126

In his

testimony, Secretary Marshall noted that Bradley had commanded, in the field, the largest force of ground troops in
history, his experience was very extensive, he was levelheaded, and a man of great honesty of purpose. 2 7
Admiral Sherman, the N'avy•s representative to the
Joint Chiefs, was well known as a brilliant strategist, and
the one who had perhaps the most complete knowledge of world
affairs and geopolitics.

He

had been Admiral Nimitz's Deputy

Chief of Staff in the Pacific campaign of ivorld War II, and
had been in comrnand of the Mediterranean Fleet.

The result

was a first-hand knowledge of both the European and Pacific
theaters of military operations.
In World War II General Collins vias in the fighting at
Guadalcanal and in Europe.

His forces seized Cherbourg in

the first large capture from the Germans after the African
26 Hearings, Part 2, p. 121.

27 Ibid., p. 501.
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campaign.

According to General Marshall, "he conducted a

classic battle, which received almost no publicity in this
country, in destroying large portions of the two armies re. .
ma1n1ng
of th e Germans a t Ma i nz • • • • u28

Marshall felt that the combined experience of this
group was such that he doubted if the Government would ever
again be able to match it at one time in the Chiefs of
Staff. 29
The commit tee decided to go beyond those v1ho were directly concerned with MacArthur's dismissal and to investigate the whole military situation in the Far East.

Only in

this way, they felt, could they understand MacArthur's
position.

General Albert Wedemeyer's knowledge and experi-

ence were called upon for this purpose.

During the earlier

years of World War II, he served as Chief of the Strategy and
Policy Section of the Operations Division of the Army General
Staff.

In 1943 he became Deputy Chief of Staff of the South-

east Asia Command.

In 1944 he was sent to China to assume

command of the United States Forces in the China theater.
There he also served as Chief of Staff to Generalissimo
Chiang Kai-shek.

He was author of the famous '1'iedemeyer Re-

port on China.
In March 1949, I,ouis Johnson succeeded James Forrestal
28

~.,

P• 501.

29

I!££. ill·
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as Secretary of Defense.

He held the rank of Colonel and was

a past National Commander of the American Legion from 1932-

33.

During the Hoosevelt Administration Johnson was Assist-

ant Secretary of War and served as Roosevelt•s special representative to the l!'ar East.

In the latter position, he held

senior diplomatic authority in that part of the world.30

He

served as Secretary of Defense until September 1950, when he
was succeeded by General Marshall.
As the Hearings proceeded, the length of the investigation became the subject of increasing concern to the Committee.

The function of a Congressional investigation is, of

course, to gather the information that will enable Congress
to pass legislation, and to check upon the functioning of the
Executive branch of the government.

A subcommittee was ap-

pointed to consider the number of additional witnesses that
should be called to testify.

Thirty-four names were formally

suggested, and a much larger number vms mentioned informally.
By the eighteenth of June there was considerable need for
ending the Hearings as soon as practicable, since t\ven ty-six
Senators had taken time out from the work of the Senate as a
whole, and it had suffered as a result of this loss of time.
~urthermore,

the work of other committees was diverted in

order to proceed as rapidly as

po_§~ibl~

30 Hearings, Part 4, p. 2570.
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controversy and our far-eastern policies.3 1

The main consid-

eration in selecting witnesses was that the Committee should
become well informed and hear from both sides of the issue,
while at the same time preventing the testimony from becoming
repetitive in character.

Averell Harriman was contacted and

said that he v!Ould be glad to testify, but that he would not
have anything to add to \vhat had been covered by previous
witnesses; as a result he was not called.

Finally, the sub-

committee tried to balance the number of witnesses presenting
views that were in conflict with the Administration and vice
versa, but at the same time limiting the list of those to
testify to persons "who had some direct relation with the
events and policies under investigation."3 2
By the time the subcormnittee looked into the matter of
the witnesses to be called, the pro-administration witnesses
who had given testimony were: General Marshall, Secretary
Acheson, General Bradley, Admiral Sherman, General Vandenberg, and General Collins; the witnesses who generally
opposed the Administration were: Generals MacArthur and
v/edemeyer, and former Defense Secretary Louis Johnson.
this point the

subco~~ittee

At

recommended that the full com-

mittee invite and hear: Major General Emmett O'Donnell, Vice
Admiral Oscar Badger, Major General David Barr, and
31

I£!S., Part 4, P• 2716.

32 Ibid., p. 2719.
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,j

Patrick J. Hurley, Major General, Honorary Reserve, United

~

States Army.

~

Three of these witnesses were thought not to

be friendly to the Administration.

They were: General

O'Donnell, Admiral Badger, and Patrick Hurley.

O'Donnell

was invited to testify at the specific request of Senator
Knowland.33
General O'Donnell was introduced to the committee as
ttone of our top Air Force commanders."

In World War II he

led the first squadron of B-17 Flying Fortresses across the
western Pacific.

When World War II was two days old he

earned the Distinguished Flying Cross for an attack on a
Japanese cruiser and destroyer escort under unusually hazardous conditions.

Later he commanded the Seventy-third

Bomb Wing (B-29), and led it on the first Superfortress atFrom July 1950 to January 1951, he was
in command of the Far Eastern Air Force Bomber Command.3 4
tack made on Tokyo.

When he appeared before the committee, Admiral Badger
was the United States Navy Commander of the Eastern Sea
Frontier.

He had been on duty in the Far East over three

years, and for another three years had gone there every six
or seven weeks on various assignments.

He testified that,

at the end of the war, he had charge of the demobilization
and closing up of Pacific bases, and went to China fre-

33 Ibid., Part 4, p. 2720-25.

34 Ibid., p. 3061.
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quently in connection with the shipping and disposition of
surplus material that was left on the islands of the Pacific.

Exclusive of the MacArthur area of command, he was the

representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Far East
in the western Pacific.35

General David G. Barr had considerable experience in
the area of the committee's interest.

He was Chief of the

Army Advisory Commission in Nanking from January 1948 until
he assumed command of the Seventh Infantry Division in Japan
in May 1949.
Korea.

He led this Division at the Inchon landings in

He held several of the country's highest decora-

tions, including the Silver Star, the Distinguished Service
Medal, and the Distinguished Service Cross.36 His assignments with the Army Advisory Commission were during the time
that General Marshall was endeavoring to arrange a coalition
government of the Chinese Nationalists and Comrnunists.

Gen-

eral Wedemeyer was opposed to this plan and was to describe
General Barr to Defense Secretary Forrestal as a "polite and
a loyal, good officer, but most entirely lacking in force.u3 7
General Patrick Hurley of New Mexico devoted his life
to the service of his country.

From 1912-17 he was the

United States attorney for the Choctaw Indian Nation.

35

Xbid., Part 4, p. 2727.

37 Forrestal

Diaries.~·

36

~.,

cit., p. 383.

P• 3061.

Dur-
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ing World War I he fought in France as a colonel in the
Army.

In 1929 he was Undersecretary, and from 1929-33 he

was Secretary of War in the Hoover Administration.

As Sec-

retary of War, he obtained the appointment of General MacArthur as Chief of Staff over the objection of General
Pershing. 38
In introducing General Hurley to the committee, Senator Russell observed that he had played a key role in the
events which were under study by the committee; that he had
served as Ambassador to China from November 30, 1944 to November 27, 1945, and that these were some of the most significant months involved in the committee's investigation.39
General Hurley was first sent to China in 1944 as
President Roosevelt's personal representative to help calm
the bitter antagonism that existed between Chiang Kai-shek
and "Vinegar Joe" Stilwell.

This personal feud had an im-

portant bearing on the course of events in China and was an
important factor in the ultimate fate of Chiang Kai-shek.
In the war against Japan, Stilwell insisted upon using all
the forces of China, including the Communists.

After years

of fighting the Japanese, the Nationalists were weakened to
the point where resistance to Mao Tse-tung's armies was not
3~ Don Lohbeck, Patrick J. Hurley (Chicago: Henry
Regnery Company, 1956), pp. 101=02.

39 Hearings, Part 4, P• 2827.
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strong enough to command effective control of the government
of all China.

The United Jta.tes government had furnished

Chiang Kai-shek a great deal of military aid in both equipment and military personnel.

However, much of the equipment

was lost in the black market of China.

Stilwell's main

theater of action was Burma, but thn United Sta.tes wanted
him placed in field command of all Chinese forces.

A long

history of foreign domination did not endear Chiang Kai-shek
or any other Chinese to this idea, but Stilwell was an impossible pill for Chiang to swallow.
v1as

The result for Hurley

that he personally became well acquainted with the po-

litical situation in China.

He was in the middle of the

struggle for control of China that took place between the
Japanese, the Communists, the .British, French and Dutch colonial intt-Jrests, and the Nationalist forces of Chiang.
~

lli

Committee hoped

1£

accomplish.

The relief

of General fviacArt.hur and the Congressional Hearings that
followed dramatized some of tho aspects of the question of
the role of the military in making government policy on the
highest level.
One of these problems concerned the most effective
and economical operation of the j)efense Department.

The in-

creasing importance of t.he military establishment in the
formulation and execution of national policy had become an
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important political and social problem.

For the United

States this was essentially a new problem, and the traditional American values and institutions in the field of
civil-military relationships faced new challenges.

In this

situation some Congressmen expressed fears of the development
of a Prussian-type general staff in this country.

The unifi-

cation of the armed forces is one illustration that was held
up as an example.

On the one hand, there were those Con-

gressmen who were alarmed at the inefficiency and lack of
agreement among the top military command; and on the other
hand, there were those who felt that the nation was being indoctrinated with some form of creeping militarism.

The fact

that, since World War II, the budget for national defense was
about tvJO-thirds of the total national budget seemed to confirm this notion.

That the United States had acquired

~new

role in world affairs was not accepted or not understood in
the minds of these people.
Certainly part of the reason for the Hearings was the
examination of the role of the military in making and executing foreign policy.

It is obvious that foreign policy is, to

a degree, contingent upon the military power necessary to
back up international commitments and to protect our national
status.

This is not to say that military factors are the

only elements involved in making foreign policy.

For Con-

gress, however, the task would seem to have been clear-cut:
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a definite investigation of the military problems involved in
the Far East, and what conditions must prevail to maintain
the principle of civilian supremacy in our newly acquired
role of leadership and responsibility in the world.
The traditional role of the military in the United
States is subordinate to the civil authorities, the President
and Congress.

The President is, of course, the Commander in

Chief of the armed forces, but a declaration of war must be
approved by Congress.

The civilian attitude toward the rnili-

tary has been one of suspicion, distrust, and sometimes
positive disJ.ike. 40 The history of many nations is but a
cataloguing of tyrannical governments established by the use
of military power.

Many Americans, mistakenly or not, view

the actual attitudes and values of military men as inimical
to freedom and democracy.

In vie\v of this it seems incon-

sistent for Americans to have elected military heroes President six times.

Hov1ever, in such men many governments have

hoped to find national security.
The machinery of the executive branch of the government did not provide the means through which advice of high
ranking officers could be directly available to the President
unless he requested it.

However, in this investigation, the

40 Burton M. Sapin and Richard C. Snyder, ~ ~ Qf
!!'.!!1 Militar;)!; ill American }"oreign Policy (Garden City, N.Y.:
Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1954), p. 3.
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committee decided to hear not only from the Secretary of
Defense, but also from the top ranking military officers
directly.
Senator Russell opened the Hearings by stating that
the committee would "attempt to obtain facts which are
necessary to permit Congress to make correct decisions in
the problems of war and peace in the Far East and throughout
the world." 41 He agreed with General MacArthur in his
speech to Congress, that the issues were beyond the realm of
partisan considerations. 42 This established a very general
objective for the committee, but so general that the problem
of defining just what the real issues were became the subject of considerable controversy.
The problem of limiting the issues was to pursue the
committee all during the Hearings.

Senator Wiley, very

early in the investigation, said, "To me we can clear away a
lot of maze and fog if we know just what the issues are." 4 3
However, Senator Russell countered with the observation,
"The Chair does not want to prescribe the limitations of
this hearing.n 44

He then suggested that a subcommittee

could be appointed to define the issues.

However, no limi-

tations were established except to set time limits for the
41

~.,

Part 1, p. 1.

43

!hi£.,

Part 1, p. 35.

42

44

~.,Part

~.,

1, p. 2.

Part 1, p. 36.
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questioning of witnesses.

Senator Wiley said that he wanted

to know why MacArthur was fired and so did the public.
:::ince there was no legislation before the committee,
it was almost inevitable that the questions would become involved with policy that was not related to the removal of
MacArthur.

Examples of this were: the China lobby, steps

taken to prevent the loss of Iran to Soviet Russia after
World War II, atom bomb development in 1945, Communists in
the State Department, and the China situation.

It is obvi-

ous that much of this had political implications.

Further-

more, the Korean War did not bring the kind of response from
the nation that followed Pearl Harbor in 1941.
Other points of issue for the committee were: (1)
\vhether MacArthur had exceeded his au·thori ty; (2) who was
right and who was wrong with respect to the prosecution of
the war, and (3) the reasons for the awkward manner of the
dismissal of the General.
In order to place the investigation above partisan
politics, the committee decided that no views or conclusions
would be set forth as that of the majority or minority, but
that members would be permitted to file their views and conclusions with the Chairman, and that they would be printed
in the appendix.

It seems that the magnitude of the issues

was such that the committee should have taken a stand and
submitted a report of the whole committee.

It would seem
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that the public would be entitled to this much, especially
since very few people would ever go into the situation to
the extent that was done by the committee.

Furthermore, as

a result, some of the legislators were able to go uncommitted on one of the most important and controversial issues
of the day.

CHAPTER V
THE CASE FOR MacARTHUR
The testimony of General Mac.Arthur.

The General's

speech to the Congress had been an impressive prologue to the
Hearings.

It had left, however, some questions that needed

further clarification from MacArthur, and there was the Administration point of vievl to be heard.

This chapter deals

with the witnesses at the Hearings who were friendly to the
General.

MacArthur was the first witness to appear before

the committee.
Just as there were witnesses friendly to each side of
the case, there were those on the commit tee vi hose questions
were designed to favor the General and those whose questions
favored the Administration.

However, the questions, the

demeanor, and the attitude of the members of the committee
were respectful and generally friendly, even when they took
the side of the Administration.

However, to have been

otherv1ise would have been po.li tically unwise at that time.
Yet much, and perhaps all, of the respect shown MacArthur
was because of his service to the nation.
Following world vJar II efforts were made to bring
about greater efficiency in the armed forces through unification of certain military functions.
brought out by MacArthur was an

One of the first points

ob~:;ervation

that there
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•.vas, in Korea, "very complete 11 cooperation between all
branches of the service. 1

The testimony tilen developed the Soviet choices of
action in Korea.

MacArthur indicated thz t he thought thu.t

Soviet military decisions were made on a Global basis rather

then by the

incident~>

occurring in Korea; that their planning

was based on broader considerations than one ceoeraphic area.
Their pl::ms; he felt, \vere flexible, and the hi;;;h couJm<n-ld
represented a high degree of mili tnry efficiency .•
Then proceeding to matters more directly concerned
wi tl1 the d:lS})Ute between MacArthur ;:md the Trum: n i\dmin-

L3 tr;t tion, he was asked

hO\<:

mr;ny grouw. troops \vere needed

to accomplish the mission in Korea.

To this the General re-

plied Uk t he h.'J.d const;mtly asked for more troops than he
~was

:).ven, but that he was unable to say ho\>

llL·rl.Y

troops

were re,,uired because he was not; permitted to prevent trw
enemy build-up of men and supplies in Manchuria.

"If this

restriction were removed," he said, "I do not believe it
would

t~

e a very great addition&l component of ground

troops to wind this thing up. 112

The question of the timing of MacArthur's recommendation to carry on rur operations over Hanchuria and to
blockade the coast of China was raised.
1 Hearinr;s,, Part 1, pp. 4-5.

He said that this
2 Ibid., p. 10.
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not done· until after the entry of the Chinese Communists
into the war. 3 The air operations he had in mind consisted

WEl.i:5

of continuing in hot pursuit after enemy planes engaged in
combat over Korea, and of bombinc; the supply bases v1hich
gave the enemy privileged sanctuary.

He also had asked that

w:>e be mrtde of the Nationalist forces of Chiang Kai-shek.

In discussions with General Collins, MacArthur had pointed
out tho need to lift the restrictions on air operations
ar;ainst Chinese bases in Nanchuria and the use of Nationalist
forces.4
In his speech to Congress MacArthur said that the
Joint Chiefs oi' Sta.ff had agreed \vi th him concerning his
proposal to blockade China, to remove the restrictions on air
reconnaissu.nce over Manchuria, and to mu.ke use or the
Nationa1is t forces on :F'orrnosa against the Chinese Communists,
He cited a message from the Joint Chiefs of Staff dated

,-

January 12, 1951 to support his statement.'
Senator Wiley asked MacArthur if he had ever advacated the invasion of the Chinese mainland by United States
ground force::>.

Tho General rwm·Jered:

"Senator you know

thot is ridiculous.

No man in his proper senses would ad6
vocate throwing our troops in on the Chinese mainlunct."
3

.I.£1.£., P•

12 ..

5 J:.Qi£.' p. 13.

6

1.£1.9.. ,

P• 29.
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Senator Wiley asked: you have indicated in your
public addresses that there has been a failure to take
certain needed political decisions in the Korean matter.
Can you te71 us what • • • those decisions might well
have been.
The General answered as follows:
I would have served
--as soon as it became FiJ)parent that Hed China was throwing the full might of its military force agr;dnst our
troops in Korea, I would have served warning on her that
if she did not within a reasonable time discuss a ceasefire order, that the entire force of the United Nations
would be utilized to bring to an end the predatory attack
of her forces on ours.

In other words, I would have supplied her with an
ultimatum that she would either come and talk terms of
cease fire within a reasonable period of time or her
actions in Korea would be regarded as a declaration of
war a.gainst the nations engaged there and that those
nations would take such steps as 8 they felt necessary to
bring the thing to a conclusion.
MacArthur believed that the way to bring the \/ar to a
1

conclusion without abject appeasement \vas only by the application of superior force.
choices of action:

He said that there were three

To pursue to victory; to surrender to the

enemy; or, he said, "what I think is the worst • • • to go
on indefinitely • • • in

that

stalemate; because what we

are doing is sacrificing thousands of men while vJe are doing
it •• • •
When he was questioned regarding the conversations be-

t,.,.een President Truman and himself at Wake Island, MacArthur
declined to answer on the grounds th,:Jt they were of a con--~ Hearings, Part 1, p. 29.

9 1.!21Q.., p. 67.

8

lill•,

P• 12.
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fidential nature.

However, in his Memoirs President Truman

said that MacArthur had told him that he thought there was
very little chance the Chinese would come into the war. 10

This point was confirmed by MacArthur's biographer, Frazier
Hunt. 11
The Administration's policy in Korea. MacArthur alleged, was n.o policy at all.

"There is, n he said, "no policy--there is nothing, I tell you, no plan or anything." 12
This did not go unchallenged by the Administration witnesses, and will be taken up in the next chapter.

Mac-

Arthur's attitude was an interesting and rather effective
method of discrediting a viewpoint with which he disagreed.
It should be said, however, that in this instance MaoArthur's approach was positive, while the Administration's
was negative.

Probably the most important strategic con-

cept of the United Nations and of the Administration in
Washington was to limit the conflict to Korea, and it was
felt that MacArthur's strategy might broaden the area of
warfare; that it could even result in World War III.
On the subject of the Martin letter Senator Green
asked if the two letters made public were the whole of the
correspondence between them.

10 Truman,
11

.QJ2•

Hunt,~·

MacArthur answered, rather

cit., Vol. 2, p. 366.

cit., P• 475.

12 Hearings, p. 68.

74
vaguely, that he felt any member of Congress was entitled,
within security provisions, to any information that he requested . 1 3
Senator Kefauver asked r1acArthur if he ha,d received
information from the State Department , on the same day he
wrote the letter to Congressman Martin , requiring further
statements .bY him be coordinated in accordance with the
directive of December 6, 1950 .

The General said that he

had not .
N~xt

Senator Kefauver asked: "But you did n ot feel

that the letter to Congressman Martin would have required
coordinating his letter as required by the order of
March 20?" 14
MacArthur ' s reply was: "Not in the slightest . " 1 5

In the Martin letter t he

G~neral

had in effect taken

his case to t he people by going to one of their elected
r epresen t at ives .

The fact that he dealt directly with the

President's political opposition was bound to arouse the
wrath of the President even though the Congressman had initiated the correspondence .
Everyone seemed to agree that a subordinate should
make his views known to his superi ors when he disagrees
with them, but probably most people would hold that it

13 I'bid ., P• 46.

14 Ibid., p. 113
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should

~3t011

es~~~ccially

there,

ato!_' Kcf:-cnver

asked

th~"

in the armed forces.

General if' he

thow~·ht

a bric;adier or ma,jor XE'neral under him to
hj_r:; ge:norrtl concent

UH~

EW

;:)en-

it proper for

t~~d-.:e

i:J::oue \vi th

theater conu;:tnnder by 1.1ri tin:; a

letter to a member o:f Congre!:5B when he knew it would be used
in the debate about the

w~y

his compnign was beins conaucted.

MacArthur replied that he wouldn't have the

tion, just

Go

fl()

sli~htest

objec-

c1id it in a courteous, polite way follow-

in(~; the normal code of n gentleman's conduct. 16

Under the

circumst:mce:::-> :it vwuld havo been inconsistent for the Genera.l

to sa:y anything else, but military officers cGrtn.inl;)' nrc
discour: 1god from tlv: une ol' J!Oli tical influence.
7

He~;.'.lrding
l''lr~.cArthur

tbe circumstinwes

surroundin~-;

his dimnissal,

testified that the first word he ha.d received was

from his wife, who was ndvised by one of his airles who had

heard it on a radio broadcast.

The aide told Mrs.

M~cArthur

becnusG h·2 fe] t th, t ;;;he could h:,_ndlo the situation better
th~n ~nyone

else.

connnu:ni CFtt1on

h:1 d

About thirty minutes lRter the official
bce.n r.ecei ved.

T'1e order relieved the

Gener:::-1_1 of hi::; cmmnand. upon its receipt,

General IU ('~C\•JF-W, v1ho

VJ8.f::l

3~50

replacin~";

him with

mih;s a\:a;r on the Kore::m front.

Crdina.rily the relief of a comm;Jnd is dom' in

fF1C1i

a way that

the new comma.nder \4ill be briefed on the current status of
16

~.,

p. 114.
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the operations.

MacArthur testified that unquestionably

this summary method of turning over great responsibilities
jeopardized the interests of the United States. 17
Whether the relief of MacArthur upon receipt of orders actually did jeopardize the interests of the United
States is a matter of some speculation, but it certainly
could have.

If it did not it speaks well for the state of

MacArthur's military organization.
Senator KnowL:J..nd called the attention of the committee and General MacArthur to an editorial in

the~

I.2.!:!f Times of Hay 5, 1951 which appe<.:tred under the heading•
"The Basic Disagreement": 18
General MacArthur advances the thesis that once war
has broken out the balance of control must be put in
the hands of the military; and that no political considerations should handicap the latter in winning such
a war; while the Administration holds that in peace or
'1'1<3.r, the civil ~overnmen t remains supreme.
This statement seemed to imply tlEl.t the Gener,:tl did
not agree with the democratic principle of the civilian control of the military in war as well as in peace.

MacArthur

called ti1e interpretation of' the Times "completely slanted."
"At no time," he said, "in our system of ,:;;;overnment is there
<'-11Y question of the civil adrrlinistrd,tion being in complete

contro1. 19

He said that what he meant to convey was that

there should be no non-professional interference in the

17 Ibid., p. 26.

18 lhiQ., Po 289.

19 l!.QQ. ill·

77
hFmdling of troops in a campaign.

He also said that whoever

wrote that article was completely biased or should have his
head exc~ined.
The
exten~dve

20

tes~imony

.Qf General Wedemeye_r.

military experience in the Far

views were desired by the committee.

:Because of very

J~ast,

v!ed.emeyer's

He had relieved Gen-

eral "Vinegar Joe" Stilwell when that officer was unable to
get a.long with Chiang Kai-shek.

He vJas in China during the

Marshall mission and saw the fall of the Nationalists to the
Chinese Heds.

According to Time magazine, he was a "classic

speciman of what the Army calls a Brain, an officer Hho is
on speaking terms with history, economics and geopolitics,
as well as with smaller military subjects.n

21

During most

of his career he had been a staff officer; eventually he became one of the most important in the Army, Deputy Chief of
~~taff

1949.

in charge of planning, from October 1948 to August
Consequently he was unusually well informed on the

many ra.mi:fications involved in the Korean situation.
For several years the famous Wedemeyer Heport was
classified top secret by the Defense Department, after the
General refused to withdraw certain statements considered
embarr;;~_ssing

by

·the State Department.

One of these i terns

20 Hearings, Part 1, p. 289.

21

~'

June 25, 1951, PP• 18-19.
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recommended the establishment of a guardianship in Nanchuria and a trusteeship in Korea.

One of the objec-

tions concerned the establishment of a guardianship of five
powers in Manchuria.

This included the Soviet Union, but it

was intended to keep Russia from taking over in that area.
The trusteeship for Korea was to be under the United Nations.
This was in 1947, at which time General Marshall was Secretary of State. 22
The testimony of Genere.l V/edemeyer brought out that
he was opposed to the idea of trying to form a coalition
government of the Communists and Nationalists in China, and
that !1e had informed General Marshall of the difficulties
involved in that plan \vhen f4arshall arrived on his China mission in 1945.

Wedemeyer did not have tl:.te difficulties with

Chiang Kai-shek that Stilwell had; he felt that Chiang was
our one hope in China and that he should be supported.
For a region that was not directly involved in the
Korean fighting, Formosa had come in for a great deal of
attention.

Of course; both Korea and :Formosa were related

to the China rroblem, and the committee wanted to know more
about the strategic importance of each region to the United
States.

Concerning Jt'ormosa, \'iedemeyer said that vlhile it

was not vi tal it was a rrwst important bastion against the
22 Hearings, Part 3, pp. 2326-27.
Albert c. Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports
Henry Holt and Company, 1958) pp. 463-79.

(New York:
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advance of Communism, and it enabled us more effectively to
neutralize offensive action from bases on the mainland.

If

necessary, Wedemeyer favored putting our ground forces on
Formosa to defend it. 2 3
When the forces of North Korea had invaded South Korea and President Truman had ordered MacArthur to resist,
MacArthur had advised that it would be necessary to make use
of ground troops to repel the North Koreans.

Aware that

most military men agreed with MacArthur, Wedemeyer happened
to think differently.

With humility he said to the committee, 11 1 could be so wrong. 1124 This did not mean that he
was opposed to the defense of South Korea, but that he would
have used air and sea forces only against North Korea.

Ob-

serving that there were many polV"der kegs around the periphery of Soviet Russia he said, "We should not allow them to
be fused at Russia's convenience and loss of manpower to
their third team." 25
On October 7, 1950, the General Assembly had adopted
a resolution stating that the essential objective of the
United Nations in Korea was the establishment of a unified
and democratic government of Korea and recommended that all
appropriate steps be taken to insure conditions of stability
23 Hearings, Part 3, p. 2318.
25 l]1g., PP• 2307-08.

24

!£!&.,

p. 2533.
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throuchout Korea.

26

This indicated that the Thirty-eighth

Parallel was elimtne.ted as tlte boundary between North <:md
South Korec.t. 27
General MacArthur had stated th;.\t he cUd not know what
the policy was in Korea.

He had further objected to the rc-

striations irnpoGed u.pon him in the United Hatiom:;' effort to
limit the war to Korea.

Wedemeyer agreed with MacArthur that

no restrictions r.-1.t r•..ll should be imposed on the the;::ttcr commander once a

mi[.;~:ion

like this one hn.d betm declared.

!uw

restrictions, he felt, req_uired a chanee in the mic:nion.

The

result was that 1:!edemeyer believed thr.t r·1acArthur our;ht to
h::1V0

been e>.uthorized to bomb enemy supply baser:; and lines of

communications and to use whatever combat-ready Nationalist
forcE's uere available on l'ormosa.
out thr.t

thec::~.ter

com,r~c:mders

General \·;ederneyer pointed

do become involved in

policy \'/hen no clear-cut. instructions rtre issued.

m~:tkinp;

He h:3. cl

E'X-

actly that experience in China when he had found it necessary
to order his forces to fire on Red Chinese who attacked

.American troops.

"A then.ter commo.nder," he said, "is com-

of direction from home." 28

foreicn policy in the

Lm1ever, it should be pointed. out that the Corr·munists 111ere

26

lli.S.· '
27 ill£.'
~)8

l.'art 1 ' PP• 361-62.
r::-:rrt

3, PP• 2550-51 ..

..!.!1.£. ' Tart 3,

P- 2347 •
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not then the government of China, and that our forces were
in China at the pleasure of the Nationalist government.
Se:nn.tor Morse did not agree that !V1acArthur had not
been informed concerning what the policy was; he said,
"Speaking for myself, I would say • • • there is no evidence
• • • that he was not fully advised at all times as to what
20
the policy o:f the Government was." ':7
General Wedemeyer replied that MacArthur had been
criticized for moving across the Thirty-eighth Parallel and
then against the Chinese forces, but that, "he had to do
those things." 30 Wedemeyer also indicated that he personally
doubted that there had been a clear-cut policy enunciated to
l~acArthur.

Senator Fulbright asked General \vedemeyer what he believed the policy in Korea should be.

To answer this the

General said that he would have to step out of the realm of
an Army officer, because "what an Army officer needs is
direction as to what you civilians want to accomplish. • • •
If you tell me what you want to accomplish, I could help
you determirw what th(:: military action should be •• • •

His answer to the Senator's question was that:

We should get

the ground forces out of Kon'.la and use a.ir and naval units;
29 Hearings, Part 3, p. 2347.
31 Ibid., p. 2362.

30

1&.2.. ill·
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th<:~t

Formosa and not Korea was strategically important to us;

we should break off relations with Soviet Russia, and take
the strategic initic:ttivo rnnw from thcm.3 2
This led to a discussion of a possible truce providing
for a cease-fire at tt1e Thirty-eighth Parallel.

Since we

went in there in the first place to create a united, free
Korea, Wedemeyer felt that such a truce would be a psychological defeat for us, but that it was better than caine on

usinr:: up our

in a mili tr:try stalemrcte aga.1nst \vhat
he CE:tlled thE: third team of the Soviet Union. 33
mGnpO\\rer

One of the most controversial aspects of MacArthur's
gnnC::ral attitude had

bE~ en

his recommendation that "vle p;o

alone" in case our allies in the United Nations did not go
<:Clang \Jt th us ree;arding such
Chimt const.

thin;.:~:>

as the blockade of the

vJhile General Wedemeyer stront_;ly favored a

United Nations effort, he also felt that in case the other
members of the United Nations would not support us we should
r"..':o ·"
~~lorle'. 34 r1 !e 01
"· c,~ no ·c'· t· 1J.11nK
,
t'm2. t th e l)Om bl'.ni; o f ·b nses 1n
·
· •
Ha.nchurir:. or the n:::wal

block<~de

of China was an e.ct of war,

since th0 initial aegression had already occurred on

th~

part of the Chinese Communists.
One of the specific points where NacArthur was con-

32 Ibid., PP•

2362-63.

34 Ibid., P• 2')36.

33

ill.£.,

pp. ?360-61.
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sidered by the Administration and the Joint Chiefs of Staff
to h:.ve gotten out of line involved the Harch 20 meGsage of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff in which he had been informed that

the State Department was "planning a Presidential announcement" concerning conditions of settlement in Korea.

1'he

message indicated th<\t time would be required to determine
diplomatic reactio:ns c1..nd permit nev.T negotiations thc:d might
develop. 35
Senator Cain pointed out that MacArthur was not told
th<::t the President was going to take any action with respect
to either a cease-fire or negotiations with foreign governments.

Wedemeyer concurred in this and also with the point

tho.t v1hile tviacArthur could not have known the nature of these

negotiations, as Supreme Com:mander in the F'ar East he should
have been advised that they had been undertaken.3 6

The t'1artin letter was the climax of the MacArthur controversy.

Senator Bridges asked Wedemeyer if he would have

answered such a letter from Congressman Martin.

The answer

was affirmative--but that he would h<we asked that the reply
be kept confidential, and he would h:,we advised the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and recommended

th<~.t

they contact Congressman

~1artin o.nd clarify the confused situation. 3'7

35 lQi£., Part 3, p. 3541.
37

!J2i.sl.. ,

Part 3, p. 230'7.

He said that

36 Ibid., Part 3, p. 2468.
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hE would not object to an officer of his comma.nd writing

frankly to any

or Congrer;;sman and \vas confident tha.t
it went on all the time.3 8
Senn~tor

The relationship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to field

commanders was the object of some searchin£: qucst:toning by
Senator

Sp~rkman.

He noted that the Joint Chiefs of Staff

serve as the top military advisers to the nation, and then
asked, "In case of a dis.::tgreement between a field commander
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to whom should we as members of

Congress and to whom should the American people look for
guidance? 11
The Joint Chiefs of Staff, without question, sir,
Wedemeyer replied. They are your senior military advisers, and I have explicit confidence in their integrity and in their loyalty • • • • I do not always
agree with their judgment as an individual but I ~Quld
never question it if I were a member of Congress.J'j

Regarding the appropriateness of the d.ismissal,General \>iedemeyer testified th;:1t when the President lOE5es confidence in or feels that he has a commander in a remote
area who

i~3

not carryiw3 out his orders, it is incumbent

upon him to relieve the commander.

However, in this case

the msnner in which it was done made most Americans unhappy.

In this case i3enator Norse agreed with General

V!edemeyer. 40
38 Ibid., J?art 3, p. 2510.

40

Ihi£. , P• 2346.

39 IQi£., p. 2476.
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.!.!:!£ test.imony of former Secretary .£! Defense, Louis
Johnson.

Mr. Johnson said that he did not have any prepared

statement for the committee, but that he would not violate
the confidences of the rresident obtained while he vJas a member of the cabinet.

He also noted that he had not talked

publicly or privately about his departure from the Defense
Department, about the Defense Department, the removal of
MacArthur, or any allied subject.4 1
Senator Bridges asked the former Defense Secretary
to explain what were the reasons for going into Korea, and
what were the objectives--as determined by the conference
that took place on June 24, 1950.
Johnson's

ex~olanation

was a realistic D.:ppraisal of

the official stand of the United States:
The fairest statement I can make as to the general
approach \vas that if you let this one happen, others
\iOuld happen in more rapid order. • • • The impression
wo::~ ~:tbroad • • • that we were not going to do anything
about it.42
Besides the fact thn,t the aggression of North Korea vlould
damage

American prestige, it \vas a clear violation of the

United Nations Charter.
Johnson said th.r;t t before the fighting began the State
DepD.rtrnent had spoken for our government on Korea.

The

recommendation to defend South Korea came from the Secretary

41 Ibid., Part 4, P• 2570.

42 I.h.Li, , P• 2585.
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of st·e,te, and it was concurred in by the Secretary of Defense.

Johnson said that the possibility of Chinese or

Russian intervention was considered a calculated risk. 43
Senator Bridges wanted to know whether, at that
time, 44 the objective was just to drive the Korean Communists back beyond the Thirty-eighth Parallel, or whether
it was the United Nations objective stated later--a democrntic free Korea, or if there were some other objective.
Johnson said that no conclusion had been stated on any of
these points, including whether we stopped at the Thirtyeighth Parallel, the Yalu River, or any other 1ocation.45
One of the chief points of interest turned on whether
MacArthur had followed the instructions he received from
Washington.
had.

Apparently the President did not think that he

Sen:-ttor Wiley asked:

11

During the time you were Gee-

retary did MacArthur follow directives of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff and Secretary of Defense implicitly and faithfully?"
Mr. Johnson: "Yes sir."4 6
Johnson went on to sa.y thc:t t he thought that MacArthur
had done one of the outstanding jobs in Japan that was ever

43

Ibid., Part 4, PP• 2584-85.

44 June 26, 1950 conference of the President, Secretaries of State and Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

45 Hearings, Part 4, pp. 2585-86.
46 ..!_lli., P•

~?591.
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done by any America.n anywhere, and that he was one of the
greatest, if not the greatest, general of our generation.
Hegarding MacArthur's recommendations concerning the
steps to be taken in the Korean fighting, Johnson was in
Etgreem1:mt with some, but not all of' them.

He approved of

the intensification of the economic blockade of China, and

of the w;val blackade of China, but not of the Hussian controlled ports.

He would have followed the advice of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff on air reconnaissance over the coastal
areas o:f Chine. and Ma.nchuria, and he would not have removed
the restrictions on the Nationalist forces on }'ormosa. 47
Johnson testified that the ever increasing burden of
the cost of national defense had become a major issue for
the Truman Administration.

In 1949 the Joint Chiefs of

Staff had asked for a thirty billion dollar budget.

This

amount was cut to about twenty-three billion dollars by
Defense Secretary Forrestal.4 8 The 1950 budget called for
still more reductions.

Johnson said that he, the Defense

Chiefs, and General Eisenhower were called to a budget meeting and were advised that the President had approved a
thirteen billion dollar defense budget.

He said that it

was the first time those present had ever heard of it, and

-

47 Ibid., Part 4, PP• 2604-05.

48

~.,

p. 2597.
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that he "was sick about it." 49

The figure had been worked

out by the President's Economic Adviser, Edwin Nourse, and
the Director of tf1e Bureau of the Budget, }"rank Pace. 50
This amount was designed to get the fat out of the Defense
establishment and trim it down to muscle.

ovm convictiom:; concernintJ thi:::;

Regarding his

Johnson said, "If

bud!:,~et,

there \vas peace this was entirely too much; if there was
w:ir

it

vJas

entirely too little. n5 1

Senator Lone; noted that

we \vere criticized for spendinf:: too much

ri{)'lt

up until the

Korean War, and then we were criticized for not spending
enough.
Johnson agreed with MacArtlrur regard1ng the contribution of our United Nations allies.

"Despite my hope in

and support of the United Nations," he said; "I am heartsick and remain indignant tlla.t

many have done so li t'tle
in sharing the sacrifices • • • • " 52 However, he did not

propose • or

St..l.{~ges

f.>O

t 'that we "go it aJ.orw."

The hand lint; of MacArthur's dismissal ha.d distressed
Joh.n~;on

as it did almost everyone--probably includin{; the

President;.

He said

th~:;. t

he would tuve asked that it be

hand. led in fwnw other way, like sendinp; Harriman or going
himself, had he still been Secretary of Defense.

The sub-

ject of dismissal had been brought up by the President

49 Ibid., Part 4, P• 2598.
51 Ibid. , p. 2705.

~·2

?-

--

50 Loc. ctt.

r- · d
--lU:...:.•'

p. <:.')712.-·
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wi:1un t1acc\rt.hur :-;en t hi::; mou;;:;age to the Vc torans of J:'oroign

lie £nid tJ1,;.t ;since he diu not luve dll ti;e facts
dismh~sal,

concerrdng t;w basis for t1w

could only mudcty up the vJa tor,
it.

:~md

hL3 personal opinion

ne declined to comrrten t on

However, he did -z;.'J.y tnat if tho :President h'l.d lo;:o.t con-

fidence in MacArthur <~ cl1::w1L;e ""as in order. 54
'l'he

succc~3sfu1

tember 15, 1950.

L:..ndinc;

Just four

:..tt

d~ys

I•Jcl;on took: pls.ce on
l~ter

:~~Jep-

Secretary of Defense

timinJ; a resignution could not he tied to such a saccessful

s t::u1c:as viere.

TLu 3ecre Ltry sa.id th.J.t he had actually been

forced to resiic,n. t•.vo <.L'<Yf> befor·<;; Inc'ton, but thJ,t bL" res-

igndtion was effective on tne nineteent;l.

He went on to say

that he did not know why he was ousted from tho Defense astablishment, but tha.t it fntrt him.

He felt thJ.t no and

HacArtLur had ca,rried t'·1e burden of th<; responsibility for
Incrwn' Vthile Gener ..il Collins hu \ gone to
argue MacArthur out of it. 55
soc~rr.ts

to h :.ve been handled

to t

nr

to

~hatever the re~sons were, it

in,~p

by General George Marshall.

Kon~a

tly.

Johnson waB su.cc:eeded

V/ha t tri(3 Pro: ident • s

rearc~on

for tldi:, action \,Jere is not indicated in ti·t<3 Truman Hemoirs,

53

Ibid., Part

55

JJ::i£.,

4, pp.

PP• 2617-18.

2586-87.

54 lQ!£., p. 2604.
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but his well known admiration for Marshall may well have
been tho explanation.

An additional factor which possibly contributed to
Johnson's requested resignation was his doubt about the
~>tate

shek.

Department attitude tm.vard Formosa and Chie,ng KaiHe said that our government "recognized" the Nation-

alist government, but did not "support" it. 56

The State

Department motion to protect Formosa with the Seventh Fleet
was a great surprise and relief to him.

This feeling went

back to December 1949, when the State Department opposed, on
political grounds, sending a military mission to E'ormosa.
The President,

disregardin~;~

military considerations, sided

with the State Department on political grounds. 57

It

therefore seems probable that the President had at least
two obvious reasons for replaci!l{s Johnson: the first was
that he felt that General Marshall was better qualified for
the cabinet post; and second, he could not have this type of
fundamental disagreement in his cabinet.

Neither could he

afford to make his reasons public.
~

testimony Qf Patrick Hurlex.

One of a few people

to know first hand why China had charl{)ed from friend to foe,
Hurley was in a position to :furnish testimony that was in
conflict with the Administration viewpoint.

56 Ibid., Part 4, p. 2596.

-

He told the

57 Ibid., P• 2578.
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committee that m.ili td.r:y pLms bad to be kE3pt secret, but that
the policies that cause tl1e commitment of a

nc~.tion

to war

should not be kept from tho people affected by the commitment.
He also felt trtiJ.t t

10

adn:'l.inistr:J.tion of our for,"Jign. policy

v1as not in keeping wi til the policy announced to t'·\.G .L\.-rr1.erican

people by tho Administration.
Hurley said thu.t tho ch:.).nge in our foreign policy
beg~n

at Yalta in 1945.

There we abandoned the principles

of the Atlantic Charter for a policy based on concessions
to communism antl imperialism, and on fear of Husr5i<:i rather
than confidence in America.

"Confidence in I\.me:r·:LGo., u he

said, "is a better basi;;; for a foreign policy than fear of
a·
"\.
'"l.
......l )uc.·
}'::)

."58
As the American Ambassador to

t~1e

Republic of China

from November 1944 to November 1945 Hurley had been under
the wartime directive of President Roosevelt to work toward
·tho unification of the forces of Nationalist and Communist
China against Japan.

However, he ha.d ordered the withhold-

ing of American lend-lea3e supplies from the communistl:.>
unless and until they recognized tha sovereignty of and

r·g

placed themselves under t Le Ropublic of China.:>
ogni tion had not been fortncoming.

Thu. t rae-

r1eanwhile tho government

of China was ·under attack from both within <l.nd vJ:Lthout.
58 Ibid., Part 4-, P• 2F129.

59 Ibid., p. 2B99.
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It

'!/>l::O

thi~3

situation in 1t1hich the United States l:L1d become

increasin.c;ly involved becau:oe of thn

l,tn,r rv';'l:lnst Japan.

1942 General Joseph Stilwell \vas chief of st'otff of

Allied armies in the China theater.
of aid.

th~c:

Because a ereat deal

given to China,, the United Stet tee,; wanted

~tJas

In

~wme

voice in the planning of military operations in the China
theater.

HO\vever, a conflict of personalities made for an

unworkable situation between Stilwell and Chianp; Kai-shek.
In addition, the record of foreign domination in China was
a source of ill-will and suspicion.

Stilwell felt that

Chiang had no intention of establishing a democratic regime
and that he was milking the United States.

60

Relations be-

tween them became so strained that General Wedemeyer was
sent to relieve Stilwell in October 1944.
While he said th<.::tt he did not ::tgree with the ".Europe
first" policy of World War II, it was the President's deci.
s1on,
an d 1Iur 1 ey
.L

'I
mac~e

1•

61
t h.1s d GClSlon.
. .

N' ever t•l.'le 1 ess,

1

Hurley believed th.:=t t we should not abandon Chhmg Kai-shek.

He found him to be honest, an able and educated soldier,
who vJas both a Chris ticm and an ti-Communi::.1 t.
~van ted

~3<:ma tor

Smith

to know wlly, in viev1 of these favorable qualities,

we had backed away from supporting him.

Hurley blamed

Sta,te Department personnel who were pro-Corrnnunir;t in their

60 Ibid., Part 4, p. 2914.

61 IQiQ., p. 2925.

---
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sympa th y.

62

In contrast, Wedemeyer had felt that the real

trouble lay in the conflict of ideologies, which could not
be made to work together.

Hurley said his job had been to

bring the two Chinas together in a united effort against
Jap1:1.n, and he believed that it could have been done, but for

disloyal elements in the State Department.

Hurley believed

that John I)atton Davies, Robert Service, and others in the
State Department wanted the United States to go over to
Communist Chim;..

Hurley vJanted the defense of China under

the leadership of Chiane Kai-shek.

\</edemeyer, on the other

hEtnd, had felt that they would never get together, and that
one or the other would have to control China. 63
~

testimony of Vice Admiral Oscar :Badger.

While

he was generally friendly to the MacArthur viewpoint,
Admiral Badger's testimony revealed some differences that
were significant.

He felt that our maJor strategic objec-

tive was to create conditions that would keep Russia from
starting World War III.

MacArthur undoubtedly agreed with

this, but so did General Bradley.

Their differences were

in how to implement the grand strategy.

In a speech to the National War College on March 14,
1951 Admiral Badger said that we should initiate political,

62 IQi£., Part 4, pp. 2912-21.
63 Albert C. Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Re£orts (New York:
Henry Holt and Company, 1958), p. 311.
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economic, humanitarian, and military objectives \vhich, in
case of v1ar 1vi t11 Soviet Rur;sia, would permit us to be engag(3d undor the most favorabh1 torms/

4

On the use of Nationalist troops on Formosa he testified tllat

hf~

las not familiar ·.vi trt their capability and th.:J.t

their use--primarily for guerrilla fichting on the mainland
of China--ought to be decided by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. 65

ile ::>aid thu.t he u.nders toad Maci1.rthur' s recommen-

dation to be for ri:iids rather than a fulJ.-sc·clle invasion of

China, but that these would he:J.ve to be very well pla.nned and
.
66
tlmed.

As to the uf;o of Formosa as a naval base 11e felt

it was too small and its facilities were too restricted.
However, he also f(-11 t ti:Lt t l''ormos<l was extremely important
"'

a,s a source of inflUence upon the thinking of ti1c: Chinese
on the mainland.

One of the things that MacArthur had resented the
most was the sanctuary allowed the Chinese over the Korean
border.

To this point Admiral Badger testified

that he was

opposed to the recognition of Chinese sanctuary, but that
his Ol)IJOsi tion applied to the Chinese vrho commit ted trw act,
<::~.nd

not the one v;ho was supporting it,

Rus~1ia.

Hot pursuit

64 Hearings, Pil.rt 4, pp. 2728-29. Admiral Oscar
Badger, speech to the National War College, March 14, 1951,
"The Far ~astern World Strategy."
65 Ibid., p. 2806.

,_ 0 •
66 ...1?1J....
I ' , 1. , p • 07PO
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of enemy planes should be made until they are destroyed.

He

\·JOuld go along with the pro hi bi tion of bombing Manchurian
bases, because we could

to~in

the war in Korea; hov.rever; a

plane attacking was another thing. 6'"{
Hot pursuit had been recommended by the Joint Chiefs
and the State Department, but it had been rejected in the

United Nations. 68

The Admiral declined to comment on the

advisability of unilateral action on this subject on the
grounds that he did not feel qualified to answer.

On the

other hand, he did say that even if we wanted to bomb
Chinese ci ·ties and our allies disapproved he would not agree
that we should go it alone. 6 9

1.h..t testimonl of Ma,jor General Emmett
United States fu :Force.

0 'Donnell,

Jr.,

In his questioning of General

O'Donnell, Senator Knowland listed the restrictions imposed
upon the Air .Force.

They are summarized as follows:

Instructions to CINCJ:o'E [1::ommander in Chief J:'ar East]
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on June 26, 1g50 that provided for employment of United States naval ::m.d air
forces against North Korea below the Thirty-eighth Parallel only.
Joint Chiefs of Staff advised CINCYE on October 21,
1950 that because of political implications, the State
Department wanted a special report to the Security
Council by CINCUNC [Commander in Chief United Nations
Cornman~ to the effect that U.N. forces would not inter-

67 lhi£., Part 4, PP• 2798-2800.
68 Ibid., PP• 2800-01.

69 Ibid., p. 2770.
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fere with the operations of the Suiho hydroelectric
power plant near Sinuiju.
November 6, 1950 Joint Chiefs of Staff directed
CINCFE to postpone all bombing missions on targets
,Ji thin five miles of the Manchurian border until further orders. This order stopped a planned attack on
the Yalu River bridge at Sinuiju, and the communication and supply centers there.70
MacArthur had protested the order to postpone the
bombing missions in the Yalu River area, and requested that
his protest be brought to the attention of the President.
Owing to General O'Donnell's position and experience
in Korea Senator Knowland wanted his views on the effects of
these restrictions.

The General testified that the United

Nations decision to restrict us to the areas south of the
Yalu put us under wraps and made us work against inordinate
difficulties. 71
·O'Donnell said that the Air Force was designed to
do a devastating type of job, but that the tactical bombing missions it was doing was something else, and that it
was not in keeping with the training and mission of the Air
Force. 72 The sanctuary allowed the Red Chinese meant that
their planes could attack our bombers on a hit and run basis
from Manchuria.

It also meant that as our planes approached

the sanctuary they were subjected to anti-aircraft fire, but
they could do nothing about it except try to evade the fire.
70 IQig., Part 4, p. 3091.

--

72 Loc. cit.

71

1.2.£.. cit.
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He further indicated thJ belief that tL.e Strd.tegic Air Command was not designed to fight a limited war.
Tile comrni t tee questioned 0' Donnell on the vJisdom of
bombing Mancriurbm bases.

From a purely mili t;:Lry viewpoint

he was probably better qualified to answer this than anyone
who appeared before the committee.

Prefacing his rema.rks

with the observation that he spoke beyond his position as a
bomber commander; he said that, in November, "he thought we
ouglJt to punish thorJe people and let them know tb:tt they
can't come in as an aggressor and get away witil it.n 73
O'Donnell's concern for wLat h.tppens as a result of tho exercise of military responsibility is an interesting contrast
with the military men who become involved in political decisions, and tho politicians who become involved in military
decisions.

He believed

tn~t

at a very small cost in casualties

\ve could have hit them hard and perhaps evan stopped them in

November 1950.

At that time their antiaircraft fire was not

good and they had very little e;ood fighter cover.
the situation soon

Hov1ever,

cttc;~.nged

to sucl1 an extent that the prob-

lam had to be reevaluated.

This turned on whether we could

bomb Manchuria and still retain

11

our Sunday punch for

in case they get out of bounds." 74

7 3 I b i d • , Par t 4 , p • 30 7 2 •

Rus~:lia

This evaluation and

74 1 oc • o i t •
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decision should be made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

A

primary consideration, O'Donnell felt, was that the
Str,ltegic Air Command functioned as a deterrent against
Soviet Russia, and our offensive potential could be weakened by a major Air Force involvement in China. 7 5 In short,
we had lost the advantage we held when China first entered
the Korean War, and we had made a military mistake in not
using the advantage when v1e had it.
Asked about Formosa as a base of operations he said
that we could get alons without it, since we have bases at
Guam a.nd Okinawa, but that he certainly would not like to
see it in unfriendly hands.7 6
Summary:.

General MacArthur's testimony indicated

that he believed that t11e Sovie·t strategy was made on a

global basis rather than on the conditions prevailing in
Korea.

While he recommended the bombing of enemy supply

bases in Nanchuria, the "hot pursu.it 11 of enemy planes, the
use of Nationalist forces, and a blockade of the coast of
China, he was strongly opposed to the landing of troops on
the Chinese mainland.

He felt the Administration in 'tlash-

ington lacked a policy or a plan for the prosecution of
the war.
Regarding the Martin letter General MacArthur testi-

75

1.21:.£!.,

Part 4·, pp. 3072-73.

76 Ibid., p. 3086.
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fL~d

t~1at

he felt t!u.t u.ny mo.:nbr.:.;r of Congress was ent;i tlc::d,

within security provisions, to
He

told

th(~

comnitte(~

~ny

·inforrestion he requested.

th.Jt he ::t{r,read completely

wit.~;

tr;e

constitutional principle of civilian su.prer:nacy of tfte armed
forces, lm t th .1.t there should be no non-professional interference in t;·Je h:J.ndJ.ing of troops in ;a, campaign.
OtLter MacArthur wi tnesse::; agreed wi t.h t),e Gener'll in
varyin{:; dee;rees.

General

v/edemeycr would h:-:tve u:_;ed

air power only to defend South Korea.

rJei3, onld

General O'Donnell

testified tbJ.t in .November 1950 \ve could f'l;,ve stoprled tl;o
Chinese if vm ha.d hit them h;::J.rd in Manc!mria, but t.ha t the

advantage we held at th;t time was not maintained.
the

Str,:lt~:;gic

Since

Air Corm.:J.and functioned a.s a mn.. jor deterrent

aga.inr;t :3oviet Hus:.1ia, O'Donnell felt that it nhould be up

to the Joint Chiefs of Staff to determine whether a major

Air Force involvement in China should be undertaken. General
v/edcnmyor C:Lgreed vii th t1acArthur

th~, t

no restr:i.ctions shm..tld

be impo::;ed on a t;1eator corrrmander once a mission had been

i..!.rhlert;;};:en.

lie concurred in the bombing of onomy supply

b'U3es in Hanc!-;uria and tl1c

troops.
th~t

u~;e

of coraba t-ready Na tiona.lis t

:1e also ae;reed tf·ut we should "go it c1.lone" if

were necessary, but he preferred a United Nations'

effort.

Admiral Badcer, though he generally

~upported

MacArthur's views, was oppoGed to any unilateral action on

our part.

He opposed the recognition of the Chinese mili-
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tary sanctuary, but would not bomb Manchurian bases.

He

also favored hot pursuit of enemy planes until they were
destroyed.
Former Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson testified
that MacArthur had followed instructions implicitly and
faithfully, but that if the President had lost confidence
in him a change was in order.

VI

c:-IA.P'r.~:R

The testimonv of SecretarY..·· of State Dean Acheson.
-

"-

-

.,...,.,.

._

I

--

-

- -

As

._.,.,___

a witness Secretary Acheson was careful not to be clever;
HL' testimony was logical and calm, but he could not match

the drama of MacArthur, and he did not try.

The fact is

that because of this, the country seemed to care less about
what he had to say. 1
The questioning of t!1e 3ecretary covered a very wide
range of subjects, many of 0hich had no direct bearing on
the relief of MacArthur.

In addition, there \vas much that

was sirnply repetitious and, it would seem, unnecosi:'iary.

It

is possible that his examiners wanted to see if they could
catch him in a contraJiction, but if so they were unsuccessful.

Send-tor Wiley was perhaps his illOst unfriendly ex-

aminer.

It should be understood that leading questions are
-

an acceptable form of examination before a Congressional
commit tee.

had

done~

Acheson agreed wi tL ;::Jenator \'Iiley that MacArtl1ur

a very fine job in Japan, and th;J,t our allies

agreed with our policy. 2
Certainly one of' tt1e weakest points for
1 U.S.

2

~

Hearin~s,

Ache~.:;on

con-

2:, World Heport, June 15, 1951, p. 34.
Part 3, PP• 1980-81.
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cerned his speech to the National Press Club on January 12,
1950, in which he said, by implication, that Korea was outside the United States Pacific defense perimeter,

It was

felt that his speech opened the door to South Korea for invasion by North Korea.

Hi.'-5 explanation of this was that the

United States had troops stationed at certain points which
formed a defense perimeter, and that the other areas would
first have to defend themselves, then the guarantees of the
United Nations would take effect.

Acheson testified that

the United Nations had never proved a weak reed before, and
that it \vouldn' t in the future. 3 It cannot be denied that
some observers might indeed question this.
MacArthur had claimed that he did not know what the
policy was in Korea; that actually there was no policy.
Senator Bridges referred to the President's statement of
November 16, 1950, in which he said, "It is the policy of
the United Nations to hold the Chinese frontier with Korea

inviolate

that a unified, independent democratic government be established throughout Korea. 114
an.d

Acheson. In the period shortly after the Inchon
ln.ndings until the intervention of the Chinese Communists, it looked as though both of these objectives
could be attained. That is, that as the forces of
the North Koreans who had been attacking South Korea
were rounded up, destroyed, or surrendered that then
th<:~ country could be put together and • • • , both

3 Ibid., Part 3, P• 1741.

4 Ibid., P• 1735.
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objectives vJould have beon re;.tlized • • • • 5
There was a distinction made by the Secretary of
State regarding the method to be used for tbe unification of
Korea.

He testified that since 1947 the United Nations, and

since 194 3 or 1944· the United States, had stood for a unified and democratic Korea; that was still our purpose and
the purpose of the United Nations.
derstand this to be a war aim.

However, he did not un-

The military objective was

to stop the attack on South Korea, restore peace, and provide
measures to prevent renevml of aggression.

Thus the Sec-

retary of State was sayinG that the military objective was
to restore South Korea to the boundaries and conditions that
existed before the invasion of North Korea.

If so, what

then were MacArthur•s troops doing up near the Yalu River
v1Lon Communist China intervened?

'J?o

~3enator

like ,em attempt to unify- Korea by force.

Cain tbiu looked

To MacArthur, cross-

ing tho Tl1irty-oighth Parallel was a tactical necessity eompelled by the Inchon developments.

A h'1lt HoulJ have sur-

rendered tho military advtmtage to tlw Communists and left
the United Nations' forces exposed to a counterattack at the
enemy's convenience.

Acheson's explanation was, "You ha.ve

not restored peace and security if tMere are people on tho
other side coming over stnd fighting ;you.

5 tlearings, Part 3, p. 1735.

You ho. ve to try

D..
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stop tl:t:J,t condition of fit:Jltinc; .J.nd v.f.::,r that i::; going on. n 6

The peculiar thing is that

~cheson's

ju3tification of cross-

inc the Thirty-eighth Parallel would seem to justify MacArthur';::; de . nand to carry the war to China b;y bombing and

blocka.de.

bring to bear for bombing the Manchurian bases of Red China,

the fundamental point vras that the Admini f. , tra tion vn:mtod to
linli t the 1r1ar to Korea.

Acl:.teson

pointed out th;Jt no one

could accurately forecast cloviet reactions, but that some
known factors had a bearing on
taken into account.

t~e

question and should be

First was the known Soviet assistance to

North Korea and Cormnunist Cb.ina.

nv/e lrno\v," s::dd Ac!>eson,

"unden.> t . t:;td.in:;s must have accomlianied this aid. 117
Second was the fact that a treaty existed between the
Soviets and Communist China.
Chin<;;, was the most importa.nt

f~von

if a treat;v did not exh.;t,

~3<'itolli

t.e of t1lc..: Soviet Union,

and her self-interest and prestige in the Fdr

difficult to see how Ruosia could

i~nore

~ast m~de

it

a direct attack on

~· .
.Lf 8
(.;tuna
1. t se ..•

Third, v;e could not expect our collec ti ve-securi ty
syst(-.rm to survive if we took action that other members of the

6

Ibid., Part 3, p. 1782

7 Ibid., p. 1719.
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system disapproved.
The Joint Chic if:;. of ;; t;~ff

[1;:-;.d

recommended trw rLpiJli-

cution of tho doctrine of "hot pursuit" of enemy pLmes over
the Yalu Hi ver.

It

VJFtS

turned down as a rer:ml t of checking

with our allies through their embasoies instead of t,oddng it
up in Uw ::iecud. t;y Council becaus13 of tho pros<:,nce of Soviet
Thi13 subject h.:::td ,\lic:;hly Gecre t c.L1ssi fica tion at the

time.

Here the diploma. tic ccn:sidera tio:nr; ou hrcighed t!w rnili-

tary tactics.
Creneral Hd.cArtr·ur had been ver;y cri tic;:d. of ti'c; trade
that was

on between some of our alliee and China,

c~rried

eE;p~H.::iu.lly

by GreD.t Britain.

He ha.d propo -ed a naval block-

-

ade to brin6 this trade to a halt.
trz.tde '-'d. tn China,

Acl1e~;on

~uestioned

about our

stated th:·d, in ,June 1950 v1e had

pL:wed an embargo on strategic materials, and held obtained

the coopara tion of ti •e mu.jor oil companior:; on

lfli

tliholding

::.;.i'Jip:ment:::; of oil from tLe I-Udcile i·;ast and JJ<:ttin America.

In

December 19 50' we pLlced a couple te Ulfllktrgo on cJll shirHnonts
from. t: . e Uni teci
'
1n

t'1W

un1 t.G(t

~j

o,.., t a

tate::; and froze all Cormnunig t C!dnese funds

t os. (l./

of ;:aate felt tru.t an
10
economic blockade was to be preferred to a naval blockade.
'L

;f

In addition to the fact

The

th~t

~..lecretary

this involved military action

directed against the mainland of China, it was also compli-

9 Ibid •• Part 3, p. 1725.

10

1.!2.i9.·,

pp. 1830-31.
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cated by the ports of Hong Kong and Dairen.
Senator Saltonstall asked Acheson if the State Departmen t had any part in making the decision that Chinese tJa tionalist troops should not be used in Korea.
Acheson.

"Yes sir, vie recommended aga:Lnst it." 11

'l'he

reasons given were, first, that it would weaken the defense
of Formosa, and second, th:J. t it was complicated by tho other
nations fighting in Korea who did not recognize the Nationalist Government.
President Truman's explanation of MacArthur's dism1ssal had been that he could not give whole hearted support
of United States and United Nations policies.

Senator Wiley

wanted to know about this failure to carry out any policies.
Secretdry Acheson said that these policies had to do with
limiting the hostilities to Korea and not taking steps which
might extend them into Manchuria or China, or possibly beyond

that. 12
Senator Wiley also called attention to a press conferonce in \vhich the .President denied tfH:tt ti;ere was any curb on
MacArthur's authority "to speak freely on the Korean

~ar."

Acheson said tlktt this was not an accurate statement
of

what had happened at tho press conference.

had been whether or not authority

}lad been

11 Hearings, Part 3, p. 1763.

The

subject

ktl-cen away from

12 Ibid., p. 1d62.
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MacArthur, by the December 6 directive, to issue communiques
on the real military situation in Korea. 1 3
However, no such curb on MacArthur was intended.
Acheson disagreed with General \.!/hi tney' s interpretation of
the December 6 order that held it as applying solely to for-

mal public statements, and not to communiques, correspondence, or personal conversations with others.
~;ree

Neither did he

with MacArthur that the March 24 ultimatum or the

Martin letter dealt with the military situation and was
within his uncontested authority to speak. 14

The tvlarch 24

statement contained an implied threat; at the srune time the
Secretary of State had been directed by the President to
carry on conversations with our allies concerning their
views as to possible terms of an armistice or a settlement
of the Korean War.

Acheson testified that MacArthur was no-

tified of these negotiations on March 20.

He said that Mac-

Arthur's ultimatwn greatly embarrassed the President and
created the impression that the United States was speaking
with two voices, one the President and the other General
MacArthur.

1r:·

:?

It may be argued that writing to a Congressman was

not any different than appearing before a Congressional
13 Ibid., pp. 1863-64.
15 IQ!g.? pp. 1790-92.

14 !h!£., pp. 1830-31.
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committee conducting hearings.
with the

However, where the contact

showed the agent of' our policy in Korea

Conc~ressman

to be out of sympathy with that policy such an argument was
unsr:1.tisfactory. 16 The Martin letter v.Jas, according to the
Secretary, not in keeping with the December 6 directive of
the President, but while it justified his dismissal, Acheson
did not agree that for a man of fvlacArthur's stature it should

be put on the basis of disciplinary action.
of having 1)olicy agreement between

Washin~;ton

It was a matter
and the Korean

commander •

.!h.£ testimony
VJh~1tever

.Q1 Secretary Qf Defense Georr:;e Harshall.

their personal differences may h1.:tve been, General

Narshall found it very distressinr,,?; to appear before the commi ttee in

a1Ino~1t

direct opposition to a great many of' the

views and actions of General MacArthur.

He said that he had

trei,ie:ndous respect for NacArthur• s military capabilities and

military performances, as well as his administration of
Japan. 17
I1arsha.ll sav1 Korea as another phase in the long, slow
struggle against Communism.

Citing the struggle in Greece
and the Berlin blockade, he said, 11 1J/e can win again .. " H3
As to the American advance beyond the Thirty-eighth Paral-

16 I'bid., pp. 1792-93.
18

~· ~!

17 1!2if!.·, l)art 1, p. 322.

v!orld Renortt Nay 18, 1959, P• 19.
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lel, he said that the United Nations' authority for this \vas
permis::;i ve rather than mandatory.

The United Nations forces

were never given the task of unify in['; all of Korea by m.ilitary action.

The unification of Korea was a political,
10
ratf1er than a military objective. J

Obviously Marshall's thinking was global in its scope,
anc1 it centered around the containment of communism.

He

said thitt there was no quick anJ decisive solution to the
struggle, other than re;;orting to another world war.

Ad-

mittedly this policy was costly, but it was not comparable
to an atomic war.
ment. We have

"We have," he said, "spurned appease-

brou~ht

to bear whatever has been necessary,

in moneJ' and manpoVier, to curb the Ei,ggressor. • • •
Korea was the latest challenge in this world-\vide ntruggle.
The way to win in Korea was to keep destroying the
Chinese armies there.

Alreri~,dy

four of their army groups had

been destroyed, some thirty-four divisions.

It was impor-

t::::nt because this was China • s trained manpower.
The much debated point made by f··JacArthur tha.t the
Joint Chiefs agreed with his phm for an economic boycott
of China, bombinc bases in N:::l.nchuria,

apply·i~s;

a, mwal block-

a.de to the China coast, <1nd the use of the Nationalist

troops was denied by Marshall.

He said that these were

19 Hearings, Part 1, p. 362.

20

I£1£.,

P• 366.

~-1

~
-I
~
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tentative objectives which were dependent upon conditions in
Korea for

implementation~

If it became necess:.:ry to evacu-

ate Korea altogether, they were possible courses of action.

Since that was unnecessary, both the Joint Chiefs and the
National Security Council felt that it was inadvisable to
· + e f,f. ec t • 21
pu t tJ~l·em lnvo

Ordinarily a field

comm~,_nder

is free to try to arrange

armistice terms with e.r1 enemy commrmder..

In this case, how-

ever, MacArthur had been notified that the President was at
work in this area..

The General's ultimatum to the Chinese

Commander, Marshall testified, "made it necessary for the
President to abandon the effort, thus losing whatever ch:::mce
there may ha.ve been at that time to negotiate a settlement
of the Korean conflict." 22

The President then directed the

Secretary of Defense to call General MacArthur's attention
to the Presidential order of December 6. 23
Bot.h Senator Taft and
th€~

~3enator

Kno\vland strongly

ur{:~ed

use of the forces offered by Chiang Kai-shek in Korea.

'l'es timon,y of both NacArthur and Marshall brout_;h t out the
fD.ct that originally MacArthur recommended t!.gainst the acceptance oi' this offer because of their ineffectiveness and
lack of logistic support.

However, as our position worsened,

21 Ibid., pp. 329-337.
23 !QiQ., p. 344.

22 Ibid., PP• 333-334.
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~acArttrur

stroncly advised the use of the Chinese

~ationalist

troops. 24
General lYJarsh:.:\11 r:laid

th~:.t

the Joint ChiGfs were con-

vinced that these forces would not be effective in Korea.
Furthermore, their departure from J<'ormo;;3a. would le::we that
island exposed to Communist attack. 2 5
As vlith the teBtimony of the Secretary of State,

had to do with tbe extension of the conflict beyond Korea.

General MacArthur • • • would have us, on our own
initiative, carry the conflict beyond Korea. against the
mainland of Communist China, both from the sea a.nd from
the air. He would have us accept the risk of involvement not only in an extension of the war with Red China,
but in an all-out war with the Soviet Union. He would
have us do this even at the expense of losing our allies
and wrecking the coalition of free peoples throughout
the \vorld. He \·!Ould havE~ us do this even though the
effect of such action might expose Western Europe to
attack by the millions of Soviet troops poised in Middle
and Eastern Europe.2b
Of course, it

i~.o

not in thE' nature of things for a

mi1i tary comma.nder to agree with all of th.e orders he receives throughout his career.

Marshall pointed out that

Eisenhower did not h;:we things all his way in the European
theater during World War II, and thRt he sometimes had disagreed with President Hoosevelt.

"It is," he said, "at times

commendable tha.t a theater commander should become so wrapped
24 Hearings, Part 1, P• 337.

26

~.,

P• 325.

L
•t
2 .,..- ....Q..£•
.£!....·
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up in his own aims • • • that some of the directives • • •
are not tho::.;e he would have written for himself. n 2 7
What brought about the necessity for MacArthur's removal was his public disagreement with both the foreign and
military policies of the United States.

It should be made

clear that MacArthur did not violate any military policy.
His suggestions for the bombing of Hashin and the utilizing
of Chinese Nationalist forces were turned down and he did
not act contrary to the orders.

Thus it was possible for

MacArthur to say that he had always carried out his orders.
This was no doubt true insofar as it concerned military operations.

However, in the area of his public statements,

MacArthur did a rema.rkable job of cloaking them with his
"uncontested authority to speak."

Secreta.ry Narshall said,

"he took issue with the policy before the world. 1128
Following the Chinese intervention, NacArthur had
made several :public statements and press releases.

On

De·~·

cember 1, he had advised Arthur Krock of the New 1.2.r1f Times
that he had received no suggestions from any a.uthori ta.ti ve
source that he should stop short of the Thirty-eighth
Parallel, or a line short of the international boundary,
and that the strategic course of the

c~~aign

was not re-

sponsible for the attack of the Chinese Communists.
27 Hearings, Part 1, p. 325.

28 Ibid., p. 416.
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Also on December 1 MacArthur had informed the
~

Q.S.

&: \vorld Report that the lirrd ts impo::>ed on his Command

constituted an enormous handicap without precedent in milita.ry history.
On the sa,me day, December 1, he had sent a message to
the president of the United Press in which he statE'Jd his com-

mand was faced with an entirely new war.

Finally he had

criticized the limitations imposed upon retaliation against
the Chinese Communists. 2 9
The directive of December 6 had grown out of these
statements, but

j_

t was put in general terms in order to avoid

m,!3king it specifically personal to t1acArthur. 30

This was the

first specific directive he was given on public statements,
and

it simply required clearance on all statements concern-

ing defense and foreign policy.
The Martin letter, like the March 24 release, should

have been cleared in accordance with this order, but of
course it would not have been released.

The letter v1as

brought to the attention of the President on April 5.

A

meeting \<Jas called, attended by the President' r; special assistant, Averell Harriman, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chief's of
Staff.

The following day the

29 Ibid., Part

1~resident

1, p. 416.

requested Narshall

30 !hi£., 9· 342.
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to obtain the views of the Joint Chiefs.
gave tho;:,e

vie~;;~3

tc the Pre;:.:;ident.

General Bradley

Gen.er;;_l i'':arsha.ll testi-

fied that all of the Joint Chiefs and all of the people who

met with the President to consider the situation aoncurred
in the relief of MacArthur.3 1

The handling of the dLmliss.•J.J wars one of the thin:;s
th:3 t rankled the Gonc;ress mo,3 t.

'fha t the i3uprene Comrn;;,nder

should hear about his relief on a news broadcast v1as inexcusablfl, and the Defense Department would have to answer f'or

it.

Marshall's explanation was t.hut Secretary of the Army

.Frank Pace, then in Korea, was to deliver the
end. l11acArthur at his residence, the Embns;3y.

mess:t.;~~e

to Gen-

Hovrever, the

day before 1'1acArtl1ur's dismissal Ha.s to t2:.,.ke place there vwre
indications that the action had become known publicly.

The

:!?resident then decided to speed up the transmission of the
official notification to MacArthur by approximately twenty

hours.

The public release was planned to coincide with the

arri VH.1 of

U1t:'

message in 1'okyo in midafternoon.

However,

Secretary Pace did not receive his instructions due to a

breakdO\vn in a power unit in Pusan. 32
Concerni.ng the news leak 3enator Hussell comm':nted,
I think thnt it h1 one of the most

sta.rtlill{~

instances

I have ever heard of, that a matter of this tremendous

3

impor~a~ce s~wuld :~:::.:.ve ~ecome

tendea that 1t

31

1..!21.Q.;

p.

sho~ld.

345.

public before it \-Jas in-

33 Ibid., p. 346.
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1:.!:12, testimogx .Q!

~

Joint Chiefs

.2..£ Staf'{.

Chair-

man of the Joint Chiefs of i3taff, General Omar Bradley, was
in a better position than e.nyone in the nation to know
whether tha..t group agreed with NacArthur.

Bradley pointed

out that the message of January 12, upon vlhich MacArthur

based his argument, was a result of the condition in Korea.
On January 10, 1950, MacArthur indicated doubt about our
ability to stay in Korea,

Bradley testified that themes-

sage of the 12th was a study of what to do in case it were
necessary to evacuate Korea.
was a study.

"To us it was clear that it

Maybe it wasn 1 t • • • to General MacArthur;

but • • • it was a study and never handled as a proposed
directive." 34
1'he foregoing testimony suggests that the Joint
Chiefs were thinking along the same lines as I•lacArthur,
but that MacArthur wanted these m.easures against China invoked immediately, while the Joint Chiefs were thinking in
terms of a worsening military situation only.
General Bradley and the Joint Chiefs were concerned
with the military reasons for NacArthur's relief, and the
committee concentrated on this area.

Bradley testified

that in his public statements MacArthur had indicated he was
not in agreement with the decision to try to limit the con-

34 Hearings, Part 2, pp. 738, 1120.
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flict to Korea.
~

M

It follov1ed that this would make it dif-

ficult for MacArthur to carry out the Joint Chiefs' direc-

f;

tives.

In other words, they needed a commander more respon-

sive to control from

Washir~~ton.

The Presidential directive of December 6 had required NacArthur to clear policy statements before making
tt1em.

However, he had taken independent action when he pro-

:posed to negotiate directly with
and

ttH~

enemy field commander,

when he had made that statement public despite the fact

that he knew the President was considering negotiations along
that line.

This action by General MacArthur, Bradley testi-

fied, jeopardized civilian control over military authori'7.5
ties.::;

The committee wanted the Joint Chiefs to explain their
differences vii th IvlacArt bur concerning how to v>lin the war in
Korea.

The course of action described as a "limited war"

w::;1,s explained by .Bradley as an effort to avoid engagir1g too

much of our po1,ver in an area that was not the critical strategic prize.
Hed China is not the povJerful nation seeking to dominate the world • • • this strategy would involve us in
the wrong wr:tr, at the wron~ plcwe, at the wrong time,
and with the wrow; enemy.'
To support this charge Bradley said that he doubted

35 l£is!., Part 2, PP• 878-79.

36 Ibid. P• 732.
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tl1o efftcacy of l.tlinning the KoreD.n War through application

of air po1r:er t:md blockade.

\<far against Chinn, he thour;ht,

would require sending ground troops to the Chinese main-

lanct.37
.Scms"tor Bridges asl{ed,
R.sk American

troop~>

11

Do

you think it is fair to

to go into brd; tle V.Jhen the enemy has a

complete sanctuary across the river?"
General Bradley.
actually. • • •

"I don't admit. the.v have a sanctuary

They are not bombing our ports and supply

insta.llntions, • . • so that in a way, we have a sanctuary,

too." 38
The policy of a limited war had led some critics to
charge

W3

with appeasement.

Bradley pointed out that a

blockade of China, to be successful, would have to include

the British port of Hong Kong and the Russian port of Dairen.
J''orsaking Korea to aggression \V'OUlcl have been appeaGemcnt,

but refusing to enlarge the conflict to the point

\~here

our

global capabilities are diminished, is not appeasement but a
militarily sound course of action in the circumstances. 39
1'he increasinG influence of the mili tnry on tho nation

in the twentieth century was examined b,v tho committee.

\'Jere

the nation's military leaders to be taken into the councils

37 Hearings, Part 2, p. 745.
39 Ibid., p. 733.

38 !Qi£., P• 751.
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of the nation, or muzzled by the cloak of civilian control o:f

the military?

The following exchn.nge on this subject took

place bet\¥eEH1 Senator Bridges and General Bradleye
Senator Bridges. If it reaches the time in this
country where you think the political decision is affecting what you believe to be basically right militarily, what would you do?

General Bradley~ Well, if after several instances in
which the best military advice we could give was turned
down for other reasons, I would decide 'that my advice waB
no longer of a.ny help, why I would quit~ • • • Let them
get some ot.her military a.dviser whosE~ advice apparently
would be better or at least more acceptable.
Sene•. tor Bridges.
ican public?

Would you H:peak out, tel1 the Amer-

General Bradley.

No

Senator

Where does the loyalty to your

Bridges~

sir. • • •

country come in?
General Bradley. I a.m loyaJ. to my country, but I am
glso loyal to the Constitution, and you have certe.dn
elected officials under the Constitution, and I wouldn 1 t
pro:f'e~'s that my judgment wa.s better than tho President
of the United States or the administration~
i'3enrttor Hridgf:::s.
ject?

\1/ould it not be on a military sub-

General Bradley.

Yes •

.3enn.tor Bridges.

i3hould you not

General Bradleyo
authorities; yes.

~c;peak

out?

I would; yes, to the constituted

Senator Bridges.,

:Gut you vJould stop there?

General Bradley.

fes.40

40 Hearings, Part 2, pp., 752-53.
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Concerning the h<wdling of the dismissal, Bradley
testified that he was not sure that the much discussed news
lec.1.k really existed.

There h::,,d been a great dec:;.l of specu-

lo,tion in the newspapers about it.

The fact that "certain

people" had made frequent trips to the White House gave substance to this speculation.

Consequently, Bradley thought,

it might be thr;.t people were jumping to conclusions as to
what might happen.4 1
The Joint Chiefs did not request the removal of MacArthur, but they were requested to give their opinions on rernoVEll, from a military point of view.

They unanimously

agreed that from a purely military point of view he should
be relieved. 42

The handli11!s of the dismissal and the timing

of the releese were directed by the President.

The method of

relief was not included in the views of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.
Quite aside from the Hearings themselves, but an outgrowth of them, General .Bradley became involved in an interesting constitutional problem during his testimony.

He was

questioned about the conference of April 6, 1951, between
President Truman, Generals fvlarshall and Bradley, Secretary
Acheson, and Presidential Adviser Harriman, regarding the
dismissal of MacArthur.

Bradley refused to divulge the

41 Hearings, Part 3, p. 1725.

42

1££.

cit.
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nature of the conference on the ground that he was in the
position of a confidential adviser to the President.

General

MacArthur had done the same thing concerning the \'lake Island
conference; Marshall declined to answer questions for the
s<:tme reason and was not challenged.

Chairman Russell ruled

that Bradley was not required to testify to the quef:>tion.
:3enator Wiley appealed the ruling to a vote of the committee.
The ruling of the chairwan was sustained, by a vote of eighteen to eight. 43
The principal arguments for Bradley's position were
the separation of' powers and the confidential relationship
similar to that of a lawyer-client, or doctor-patient.

The

chief argument against this position was that it wc:ts public
bm:;inest':i.

Senator \Vi ley's reaction

1t1as th~1t

the Hearings

were "not only a whitewash but a washout.n44
Army Chief of Staff, General J. Lawton Collins, followed General Bradley as a witness.
the~

He was asked early in

questioning what he would do in case there were a con-

flict between duty and what he believed to be in the best
interest of the country.

He replied that he would feel compelled to resign and speak out. 45
The differences between MacArthur and Collins on strat-

43 Ibid., Part 1, PP• 870-72.
45

lhi£.,

Part 2, p. 1194.

44 !hi£., p. 912.
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cgy \-.ICre intcrestlnc;.

It ap:!e<:lrs t1ut Mrw1\rthur'n strategy

prevailed in Korea itself, but not without some miscivings on
tilJ0 llnrt of Collins.

H<c: reftl:"":ied to c:r.i ticize thr,: troop de-

ployment in Korea, but. he dic1 not r:tpprove the ;3ending of AmericEm

troo:p:~;

all the wny to the Yalu E'iver.

He so.id th<;..t

only Korean troopr:> should have been sent into this are£i. in

order to prevent China from s.:wtng that they \.>Jere thres. t-

ened by the presence of American troops on the Manchurian
MacArthur said that it was a matter of military

border.
nece::mi t_y·

anc~

tfu:;,t he could uo t stop short of the Yalu.

Collins testified that MacArthur could have stopped on the

high ground short of the Yalu, but that in fairness to MacArthur it should be noted that Red China inv2ded Korea before
l/!acArthur' s forces reached the hich ground.

The point is that

MacArthur took exception to this suggestion of the Joint
Chief:::~

which, Collins c1d<'led, was not e.n order.

It was not

feasible to order troop deployment from 7,000 miles avmy,
but it was a.ppropriate to state tho policy within which to
operB.te.

The military necessity to vthich fvJacArthur re:fe:rred

had reference to weaknesses of the South Korean troops.
This eutimrte proved to be correct in the fighting against
.
46
ComiJ:LUnl. ;:; i ~ C·luna.

In general, ColJ.im> held about the
.
P ar t· 2 , PP•

._It>- 1..., •

1''~~-

Sf:Jllle

views as
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Bradley with respect to limiting the war to Korea.

A

naval

blockade would hrwe to include the port of Dairen and possibly even Vladivostok.
and

He said that he had been in Dairen

that it is wholly modern and efficient as a port.

To

make such a blockade effective would be one of tho:3e borderline things that might result in large-scale WEJ.r. 47 Purthermore, if we got into a large-scale war we would need allies,
and

any unilatera.l action would preclude just that.
The Joint Chiefs' study of Ja.nuary 12 that had caused

so much controversy was made a point of questloning by Senator Russell, who wanted to know if General Collins had discussed it v1i th General MacArthur on
Japan.

hi~;

January 1951 trip to

Collins replied tha.t he had told General

~1acArthur

that the items listed in that communication were representative of the views of the Joint Chiefs of various courses
of action that might be taken if it were imperative to take
them. 48

Thif.l trip, and the study of January 12, were the re-

sult of the desperate situation in Korea.

MacArthur had in-

dicated that we might be forced out of Korea, but since this
did not happen, the measures posed in the study were not in
order.
It had been charged that the surrender ultimatum of

47 IQi£., Part 2, p. 1189.
48 Ibid., pp. 1189, 1210-11.

') '7
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MacArthur to thf; Chinese commD.nder, backed by threats of
carrying the war to the China mainland, embarrassed the President in his effort to negotiate a settlement.

Senator

Wiley asked if such a demand were unusual for a commander in
the field.

General Collins stated that it was not, and that

twice before HD.cArthur had made such demands on the enemy,
but in each case vd th the knowledge of the Joint Chiefs of
,,('t a f'f • 49
Recarding the handling of the dismissal, Senator
Smith criticized the sending of the message which ordered
MacArthur's relief, and held that one of the Joint Chiefs
should have gone to Japan to advise him of' their thinking.
Smith felt that MacArthur should have had the opportunity
to see his troops, and that if the friction had been explored
and could not be resolved, MacArthur should have been given a
chance to withdraw. 50 General Collins regretted that the
d1sm1st:;al was not handled in the way that it was planned,
that is, without any breakdown or news leaks.

He did not be-

lieve it had any adverse effects on the Army in Korea, because General RidgHay vms immediately available.
it was done • • • , " Collins said,

11

"However

it v1ould have been a

shock to General MacArthur."5 1

49 Hearings, Part 2, P• 1196.
50 IQi£., pp. 1272, 1319.

51

lBi£.,

p. 1220.
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GenGrc.l Hoyt

~>.

Vandenberg, Air }'orce Chief of .Staff,

vas tho next witness before the committee.

He believed that

nt3 sea power dornina.ted the world before the t\>Jentieth cen-

tury, it would now be dominated by the nation that controlled
.
t}1e a1r
space. 52
By this time the questions of the committee seemed,
gener::llly, to run along two lines.

1'he first concerned

whether all of the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered MacArthur to be wrone in speaking his mind on Korea,
and the other concerned the strategic concepts in each of
their respective areas.
General Vandenberg a...:q;reed with Senator Norse that if
a military leader disagrees with the Commander in Chief, he
has

an undoubted

ri~:-~ht

to carry the case to the American

people, as a citizen, but 11e should resign before he speaks
out contrary to national policy. 53 However, the Air Force
Chief himself had publicly disagreed with Air .'F'orce budget
cuts on two different occasions. 54
The appa.rent

~:tgreement

among the Joint Chiefs on

MacArthur and on the Korean strategy seemed open to question.

Senator Bridges asked Vendenberg if he had ever dis-

agreed with other members of the Joint Chiefs on questions of
52

.!.2.!.£!.,

Part 2, p. 1382.

54 IQiQ., P• 1385.

53~.,

p. 1404.
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strategy.

General Vandenberg replied that he and the rest of

the Joint Chiefs had agreed quite generally, but that three
individuals, representing three services, were going to have
differences of opinion, and they had to be expressed very
vigorously, if they were to be of any value to the Governr:r.;

ment.~'

The fact is, of course, that these differences had

to be resolved without public debate.
The strategy of the Korean

l.~ar,

which lay

\lri thin

the

realm of air power, was a major point of the MacArthur
thesis.

Vandenberg said that he was opposed to bombing mis-

sions north of the Yalu River, because a major involvement
of air power in Manchuria and China would prevent us from
being able to operate at full power in any other area.

The

forty-odd-proup Air Force of the United States was a "shoestring Air Force," yet it kept the balance of po"''er in our
favor. 56

In the matter of hot pursuit Vandenberg :felt that

it would hnve been of morale value to our Air Force, but
would not have been decisive.5 7
Sena,tor Smith asked the General if he thought l-1acArthur had misrepresented the Joint Chiefs by his reference
to the January 12 trstudy" of possible alternative courses to
be tftken if we vJere driven out of Korea.

Vandenberg said

55 Hearings, Part 2, P• 1384.
56

l£1£.,

PP• 1378-79.

57 lQ!Q., P• 1388.
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that he did not believe that MacArthur had misrepresented
the Joint Chiefs, but that he did believe MacArthur must
have misunderstood their intentions. 58
Regarding the jw3ti:fication of MacArthur• s dismissal,
Vandenberg said that he would not get into any of the legal
ramifications of' intent because it had nothing to do \"i th

his recommendations.

Instead he put it on the ground that

t'lacArthur did not see eye to eye on policy; that a field commander had to be given considerable latitude, and in the use
of that latitude, there vias danger if he felt strongly opposed to the policy,59
The la.st of the Joint Chiefs to appear was Admiral
J:,orrest P. Shermt::1.n, Chief of Naval Operations.

The com-

mittee's chief interest in Admiral Sherman concerned the
propoGed blockade o:f China.

The Admiral cited a few per-

tinent examples of China's foreign trade.

From Janua.ry to

April 1951, over 450 American built trucks arrived in China.

A considerable quantity of strategic materials went to China
Also, India was an important reshipment
region for thL'; sort of thing. 60 The weDJrnesses in the
through Hong Kong.

economic blockade could be reduced, and actually its eff'ecti ve:ness \'las improvine; at that time.

58 Ibid., PP• 1396-97.
60 Ibid., p. 1515.

He favored a United

59 Ibid., p. 1391.
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Nations blockade, but not a unilateral one. 61
To understand the problems of a blockade, it is neeessary to consider the legal ramifications from the viewpoint of international l<:>,w.
briefly.

Admiral Sl'1ermr.m reviewed these

First, it is a belligerent right, and therefore

implies a state of war.

Second, it must be limited to the

ports and coaJ:1t belonging to or occupied by an enemy.
Third, it must not bar access to neutral ports or coasts.
Ji'ourth, it must be applied equally to the ships of all
nations.

Finally, to be binding, it must be effective. 62

The result of all these factors was that a blockade
of China was vulnerable beCtlUse of the ports of Hong Kong

and Dairen.

the former was not a neutral port, but that did

not change the fact that a great deal ofmerchandise went
through it to China.

Furthermore, a blockade would make

China. more dependent upon Russia for war materials.

How-

ever, the Hukden-Tient.sin Hailroad carried most of the supplies from Russia, and it \vas long, inadequate, and vuln.er63
• •
b t age, an d nava l ra1. d.1ng par·1es.
t.
a bl e t o easy l-oomo1ng,
sao

On the Joint Chiefs' study of January 12, Sherman
said that it was conditional in nature; courses of action to
be taken if events in Korea went against us. 64 Sherman
61 Heariw{s, Part 2, p. 1530.

62 Ibid., P• 1513.

64 Ibid., pp. 1532-33.
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admitted that the Joint Chiefs were terribly worried about
the possibility of being driven out of Korea.

This worry

was the reason for the study; most of the items indicated
had been put into effect.

It seemed to follow that there

was good reason for MacArthur to believe that the whole plan
would be put into effect, but all of the Joint Chiefs testified as to its conditional character.
On the subject of MacArthur's relief, Senator Johnson
asked if he had recommended it.

The Admiral replied, "I did

not recommend it, sir; I was asked for my military opinion
and I gave it. n

This was to the effect tha,t r'1acArthur should

be relieved. 65
Senator Bridges questioned Admiral Sherman concerning
our objective in Korea; whether we were fighting for the
original United Nations' objective of clearing the Reds out
of Korea, or perhaps whether the Admiral had not been told
what the objective really was.

The Senator seems to have

used the same label for the North Koreans as for the Chinese
Communtsts.

This may have been all right insofar as they

v.rere both cut out of the sr.ane cloth, but it made a difference v.rhen it came to our objective.

Admiral Sherman said

that he believed the objective was to defeat the Chinese
Communist Army within Korea and north of the Thirty-eighth

65 Ibid., p. 1530.
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Parallel. 66

It is rather amazing to find that a person as

highly placed as Admiral Sherman should not have the same understanding of the objective in Korea as the Secretary of
Defense.

General Marshall testified that the military ob-

jective was to repel the invasion of South Korea.

Secretary

of State Acheson testified similarily with respect to our
objective.

Sherman did agree with Marshall and Acheson that

the strategy o:f punishing the Red Chinese in Korea offered
the best chance of achieving success.

However, should that

policy suffer reverses, he felt then the strategy would
have to be changed.
Summary.

The key witnesses against MacArthur were

members of the Truman Administration.

Acheson and Marshall

were the principal critics of MacArthur's stand.

Secretary

Acheson testified that NacArthur had done a fine job in Japan
and our allies agreed with our policy there.

Acheson replied

to the alleged lack of policy by making a distinction between our policy and our war aims.

Our policy in Korea looked

to a unified, independent democratic government, but our

war aim was to stop the attack on South Korea.

Regarding the

proposal that the United States take unilateral action if
our allies did not support us, he said that our collectivesecurity system could not survive if we took action other
66 !Qi£., Part 2, p. 1528.
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members of the system disapproved.

He opposed the use of

Nationalist troops on the grounds that it would weaken the
defense of Formosa, and was complicated by other nations
fighting in Korea that did not recognize the Nationalist
Government.

Finally Acheson denied that MacArthur was

not allowed to issue battle communiques on the real military situation in Korea.

However, he felt that the Gen-

e:;ral' s release of March 20 concerning truce negotiations
gave the impression that the United States was speaking
with two voices.
Secretary of Defense George Marshall had a military
point of view and at the same time a global picture of the
situation.

He believed that the Nationalist forces would

not be effective in Korea.

He testified that MacArthur's

removal was necessitated by his public disagreement with the
foreign and defense policies of the United States.

He made

it clear that MacArthur ha.d not violated any military policy,
but he had mEtde public his disagreement vlith it to such a
degree that it interferred with the carrying out of that
policy.

All of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Marshall testi-

fied, concurred in the relief of General MacArthur.

General

Bradley's testimony was probably the most dt-l.rrtaging to MacArthur.

The principal point brought out by Bradley was that

MacArthur's strategy would involve us in the wrong war, at
the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy.
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He pointed out that we also had sanctuary since the Chinese
did not bomb our ports and supply bases.

He felt that a

blockade would involve the ports of Hong Kong and Dairen,
and therefore would not be tenable.

Furthermore, t-1ac.Arthur

was not in agreement with the decision to lirrli t the conflict
to Korea, and his actions, Bradley said, jeopardized the
civilian control of the military authorities.
Both Generals Bradley and Collins agreed tl1at they
would have to re:z;ign and speak out in case they were involved in a conflict in which duty and the best interest of
the country could not be reconciled.

CHAPTBH

VII

CONCI,USION

Political factors.

Tht3 imraediate problem of the com-

mittee vras the di.smissnl of General
portant was the
military

i11

underlyir~

11acArthur~

Just as im-

problem, the expanded role of the

national affairs.

Given the new international

responsibilities of the United States, how could necessary
military contributions be made without permitting a state
of creeping militarism?

The committee had to exaJnine the

controversy in the light of the constitutional principle of
civilian surpemacy, and determine where a breakdown had occurred, for that was the real basis of MacArthur's dismissal.
In order to keep the Hearings on as ne<1r a nonpartiso.n basis as possible, the committee decided that it
would not publish any conclusion of its findings, but would
permit the committee members to state their own conclusions
in the Appendix.

vlhile it seems strange that the cornmi ttee

could not rise above partisanship on such an issue, perhaps
it was the most realistic thing to do.

After all, MacArthur

certainly had moved on to the political stage.

The point is

that the immediate situation was fraught ltJi th political overtones, but the underlying problem should have been free from
partisan debate.
Since there was no limitation of issues or purpose,
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some Senators

~1ere

inclined to use the investigation :for

political objectives.

Senator Wiley said, "You have got some

advocates instead of investigators." 1

However, the Senator

was as sharply critical of the Administration, and as proIvlacArthur, as anyone on the committee.

Apparently it was

politically expedient to side-step a conclusion at this
time.
cooler,

Another time, wllen
1:1.

the~

temper of the nation was

conclusion probably would h<l..Ve been reached.

One of tlle most important outcomes of the \-!hole in-

vestigation was the education of the public on our foreign
and

military policies.

This can largely be attributed to

the extensive coverage given by the press.

However, the

attitude of the press was generally pro-MacArthur.

The

Korean \t!ar was unpopular, and the Adrninistrr::.tion was blamed
for it.

The great concern of the press could not fail to

influence the members of the committee to be diligent.
Time magazine reported that there

viaS a

case to be

made against the Admini;.:;tration, but that the Republicans

failed woefully to make it. 2

This was because they \.;ere

divided among themselves on }"'ar Bas tern policy.

J!'urther-

more, many on the committee were favorably impressed by
Secretary of State Acheson's grasp of the situation; this

1 Hearings, Part 2, p. 915.
2 Time, "The One That Got Away," June 18, 1951,
pp. 22-23.
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included Senator \'Jiley, who complimented the Secret::1ry on his
knowledge of the complicated affairs of state.

In spite of

the failure of the Republicans to make their case, the dismissal of MacArthur was a factor in the Republican victory
in 1952.

A resurgence of isolationism occurred, and the

General, as a national hero, was a political asset.

His pro-

gram of building a Far Bastern policy around Chiang Kaishek r.:md United States air and sea power fitted neoisolationist patters of thoueht very well.
The

militar~

implications.

On the military side, the

policy of a limited war failed to capture the imagination of
the American people, but it did prevent a general war in the
F'ar East.

In reality MacArthur's strategy was not so dif-

ficult a choice as that of the Joint Chiefs; he was backed
by centuries of tradition.

HovH:~ver,

he was not backed by

tradition when he decided to go over the head of the President

Emd

take his case to the people of the nation.

The

idea that MacArthur was unaware his line of action was improper does not do justice to his intelligence.

Further-

more, it is inconceivable that he would have tolerated anything of a similar nature from one of his generals who disagreed with his strategy or tactics.

Therefore one can only

conclude tha.t he believed that he must make himself a martyr
to patriotism.

Of course he did not doubt the loyalty of

the President, the Joint Chiefs, or the Secretary of State,
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but he did believe that they had been misinformed by people
whose loyalty to American was questionable.
The Hearint:ss seemed to point to generals lending
themselves to political exploitation by both parties.
Walter I,ippmann wrote that such a thinc.<:; \<Jould lead to an
intolerable schism within the armed forces.

The result

would be generals of the Democratic Party and generals of
the Republican Party. 3
The investigation posed a threat to the confidential relationship between the President and his chief military

advisers~

The integrity of this relationship is vital

to the security of the Nation.

Fortunately it was upheld,

and it is to be hoped that this precedent will stand.

It is

to be subjected to more tests because of the increasing influence of the military establishment.
When it comes down to who was right and who was wrong
in Korea there is no black and white answer.

General Mac-

Arthur was wrong when he did not cooperate with the intent
of the policy set down by 1'/ashington.

He was inclined to

say that tbere was no policy when it went contrary to his
ovm.

ideas.

However, 'iJashington was not crystal clear about

its objectives, and the fact that Admirt1l Sherman did not
understand them to be exactly what Acheson and Ivia.rshall un3 New York Herald Tribune, April 30, 1951.
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derstood them to be makes the point.

It is quite possible

that MacArthur could not accept the policy created in Washington.

After all, his forces were nearly driven off the

Korean peninsula, and he was bound to have some plans about
what should be done under these circumstances.
However, no one will ever know what the outcome of
MacArthur's strategy would have been.
was dangerous, but so was Inchon.

It was bold and it

The President and his

advisers reluctantly went along with Inchon, but not \vi th
the rest of MacArthur's recommendations, which they felt
would spread the war.

It was the President's move, not Mac-

Arthur's, and rightly or wrongly it was he who had to answer
to the electorate, not MacArthur.

Yet if MacArthur felt so

strongly, it was his duty to speak out; but as a civilian,
not as a general, a.nd especially not as a. theater commander
in wartime.

It would have been necessary for him to resign

from the Army; hO\vever, he would have mc:tde a stronger case
hc.-ld he done so.

His activities not only weakened his argu-

ment. they increased the distrust of the military.
Because of General MacArthur's many military successes; particularly Inchon, he had good reason to have
faith in his own theories and strategy.

However, when he

began to make plans which called for carrying the war to
China, he enlarged upon the functions of a field comma.nder.
In this situation he did not have as much information avail-

137

able as the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

If he had been willing

to limit his polemics to the Joint Chiefs, it seems probable that he would have achieved some degree of success for
his strategy.

Instead he found himself in a situation in

which the sails were too big for the ship, and it foundered
in the storm.
If the nation is to try to limit warfare, it is obvious that it must have military commanders who are in agreement with that principle.

Modern communications hc-:we modi-

fied the degree of latitude necessary to give a field commander.

There is no doubt that field maneuvers cannot be

dictated from Washington, so the degree of latitude allowed
the commander is not fixed or absolute.

This makes it all

the more important that no conflict exists between these two
areas.

The fact that MacArthur erred in his handling of his

differences with the President, but nevertheless retained
the adrniration of so much o:f the nation, speaks out eloquently for him.

Few people in our nation's history have

been so wrong and so respected at the same time.

However,

it was just this respect and admiration that made the dispute possible.

From anyone else it would never have been

allowed to reach such large proportions.
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APPBNDIX
Chronology of import&mt events.
1.

December 25, 1948--the Soviet Union announced the withdrawal of its forces from. North Korea.

2.

June 29, 1949--the United States completed withdrawal
of its occupation forces.

3.

June 5, 1950--North Korea proposed negotiations for an
all-Korean assembly but refused to deal with the govermnent of .Syngman Hrwe.

4.

June 25, 1950--start of the Korean War. North Korean
troops crossed the Thirty-eighth Parallel at eleven
lWints.

5.

June 27, 1950--United Nations Security Council asked
member nntions to furnish assistance to the Republic
of Korea. The United States intervened immediately.
NacArthur was made Commanding General of the United
Nations forces.

6.

Au,gust 28, 1950--NacArthur in a message to the Veterans
of Foreign Wars opposed appeasement and defeatism which
\vould lead to abandonment of Formosa.

7.

September 5, 1950--At its farthest advance North Korea
held most of the Korean peninsula except for the Pusan
beachhead.

8.

September 15, 1950--Inchon landing.

9.

October 9, 1950--fvlacArthur ordered United Ha.tions forces
across the Thirty-eie;hth J)n.ral.lel. ~li thin three weeks
his forces were approaching the Manchurian border at
several points.

10. October 15, 1950--I:Jake Island meeting.

11. October 20, 1950--American troops captured Pyongyang,
the capital of North Korea.
12. October 28, 1950--Red Chinese Army elements were identified in North Korea.
13. November 24, 1950--HacArthur launched an end-of-thewar-by-Christmas offensive.
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14. November 28, 1950--Red Chinese armies stalled and threw
back General MacArthur's drive.
15. November 28, 1950--MacArthur announced that the United
Nations forces faced an entirely new war.
16. December 1, 1950--MacArthur announced that orders forbidding him to attack Red Chinese north of the border
put United Nations forces under "an enormous handicap
without precedent in military history. 11
17. December 6, 1950--Joint Chiefs advised MacArthur of a
Presidential order requiring clearance of speeches and
press releases with the Department of Defense or State,
whichever was appropriate.
18. March 7, 1951--United Nations forces recaptured Seoul.
MacArthur reported thut the battle line would remain a
theoretical military stalemate as long as there was "a
continuation of the existi~; limitation upon our freedom of counter-offensive action and no major additions
to United Nations strength in Korea."
19. March 18, 1951--Congressrnan J¥1artin's letter to MacArthur
inviting his views with respect to America's position in
Asia.
tljarch 20, 1951--Hacl\.rthur's reply to Congressman Ivlartin.
20. March 20, 1951--MacArthur was advised by the Joint Chiefs
of Sta.ff that the United Nations was prepared to discuss conditions of settlement in Korea, and that the
Thirty-eiehth Parallel had no military significance.
t'1acArthur' s recommendations on military procedures were
invited.
21. March 24, 1951--MacArthur's ultimatum to the Chinese military commander.
22. March 24, 1951--A Joint Chiefs' message to MacArthur advised that the President had directed his attention be
called to the Presidential order of December 6, 1950;
also advised that any further statements must be coordinated as provided in that order.

14-4
23. The State Department subsequently announced that the
political issues which General MacArthur had stated were
beyond his responsibility as a field corrunander; that
the.\' \.Jere being dealt with in the United Nations and by

intergovernmental consultations.

24. April 11, 1951--General MacArthur was relieved of his
command by the order of I)resident Truman.

